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AN OVERT TURN ON COVERT ACTION 
A. JOHN RADSAN* 
“At its best, covert action should be used like a well-honed scalpel, 
infrequently, and with discretion lest the blade lose its edge.”† 
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INTRODUCTION 
Soon after 9/11, President Bush issued what has been described as the most 
comprehensive plan for covert action since the Cold War.1  Attack al Qaeda 
everywhere.  Disrupt its plots.  Penetrate its cells.  Capture or kill its members.  
Do what is necessary.2 
The Bush plan probably continues to this day in some classified form.  My 
plan, in this open format, is to provide a foundation for answering two sets of 
questions about American covert action.  The first set is about delegation.  Of 
particular relevance after 9/11, may the President designate, say, fifty members 
of al Qaeda for capture or death, giving the Central Intelligence Agency the 
discretion to go after “similarly situated persons?”  To be more specific, may 
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA), under the broadest 
presidential authorization, order a Predator strike to kill a suspected terrorist?  
Or must the DCIA return to the President for approval?  The second set of 
questions is about notice.  May the President routinely limit congressional 
notification of covert action to only eight members of Congress, not including 
any congressional staff?  In other words, may limited notice be the rule rather 
than the exception after 9/11?3 
These two sets of questions, more about the process than the substance of 
covert action, are large enough for one article.4  Process is most important 
 
 1. Dana Priest, Covert CIA Program Withstands New Furor; Anti-Terror Effort Continues 
to Grow, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2005, at A1. 
 2. See id. 
 3. Another former assistant general counsel has already opined that limited notice is 
contrary to the spirit of current legislation.  See Suzanne E. Spaulding, Power Play: Did Bush 
Roll Past Legal Stop Signs?, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2005, at B1 (urging that limiting classified 
briefings to only eight senators and representatives amounts to “a process that effectively 
eliminates the possibility of any careful oversight”).  Spaulding further opined that under the 
National Security Act, “[t]hese gang of eight briefings” should be rare and only exercised under 
“extraordinary circumstances”—especially since “[i]t is not realistic to expect them, working 
alone, to sort through complex legal issues, conduct the kind of factual investigation required for 
true oversight and develop an appropriate legislative response.”  Id. 
 4. A “lethal” covert action presents two other questions not treated in this paper: (1) 
whether it is consistent with the ban on assassinations in Executive Order 12,333; and (2) whether 
it comports with United States and international law.  See Abraham Sofaer, The Sixth Annual 
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when the checks from Congress and the courts are soft to non-existent.  
Process may determine whether the White House fails or succeeds on the dark 
side. 
Not drawn into a broad discussion of counterterrorism, a few separate 
factors are held constant here.  Both the Executive Branch and Congress, in an 
invitation to struggle, have overlapping national security powers.  Among 
many powers, the President has broad reach through the Commander-in-Chief 
Clause whereas Congress controls the purse.  As to policy, dealing with 
international terrorism involves a paradigm somewhere between law 
enforcement and the laws of armed conflict, or, perhaps more precisely, 
something beyond both paradigms.  In terms of national security, international 
terrorists do not pose as great a threat as the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War, but they are more dangerous than drug traffickers and bank robbers.  
Those things are all given. 
Long past the soul-searching of Watergate, very few people now question 
whether the United States should conduct any covert action at all.  Times have 
changed, and a foreign policy that is always humane and honest has been left 
for dead.  The world is so dangerous after 9/11 that it would be irresponsible, 
perhaps insane, to suggest that our intelligence agencies, whether engaged in 
covert action or intelligence gathering, should be disbanded.  The question is 
not whether we should engage in covert action, but how often and under what 
circumstances. 
The trend is toward transparency.  Our nation has been conducting covert 
action with a greater public awareness and a higher level of congressional 
participation than during the Cold War.  Despite the doomsayers, the statutory 
checks on covert action have not damaged the nation.  Although most accept 
that Congress should not second-guess battlefield decisions and that the 
President best embodies the necessary qualities of secrecy, vigor, and dispatch, 
those notions are not definitive in an analysis of separation of powers on a 
complicated matter such as covert action. 
To help answer the questions about delegations and notices, this Article 
proceeds in classical form.  Parts I and II provide background: Part I is a 
selected history of covert action since World War II, while Part II provides the 
framework of statutes and regulations that affects covert action’s legality.  
Parts I and II do take a large share of pages.  Someone new to the subject 
should not jump into the current conversation without a general understanding 
of the history and the law.  For that reader, Parts I and II summarize what is 
 
Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law: Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 
126 MIL. L. REV. 89, 91 (1989). 
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otherwise available in books.5  A reader who already knows this history and 
law (or is not interested in it), can jump to Part III. 
Part III discusses the extent to which the President may (and should) 
delegate authority for covert action.  (Unless the President expects to do 
everything himself, some things must be entrusted to subordinates.)  Part IV 
revisits a perennial theme: the balance between congressional oversight and the 
President’s prerogative, for operational and political reasons, to limit 
knowledge of a covert action to a small group.  Part V, before a short 
conclusion, suggests how covert action could become more transparent while 
preserving its sources and methods.  To that end, a new executive order and a 
new statute are considered. 
I.  HISTORY 
This history samples the covert action the CIA has conducted since its 
creation in 1947.  Covert action is separate from the two core functions of our 
intelligence agencies: collecting and analyzing foreign intelligence.  Since 
World War II, every President has ordered some form of covert action.  Thus, 
covert action remains a third option for American foreign policy beyond the 
first two options of diplomacy and combat. 
On covert action, the CIA is often damned when they do, and damned 
when they do not.  The first type of damnation came in 1961 after the landing 
at the Bay of Pigs failed to inspire a revolt against Fidel Castro.6  The second 
type came in criticisms, after 9/11, that the CIA should have killed Osama bin 
Laden, rather than just trying to capture or to disrupt him.7 
Our moment in 2009 continues to be dramatic.  Today, animals and 
machines reach places beyond the stride of American loafers and boots.  Just a 
few years back, on November 7, 2002, something that resembled a large 
mosquito flew over a distant region of Yemen, hovering without much of a 
buzz at 15,000 feet.8  It was an aircraft without a pilot.9  A camera on board 
 
 5. See WILLIAM J. DAUGHERTY, EXECUTIVE SECRETS: COVERT ACTION AND THE 
PRESIDENCY (2004); ROY GODSON, DIRTY TRICKS OR TRUMP CARDS: U.S. COVERT ACTION 
AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (1995); JOHN JACOB NUTTER, THE CIA’S BLACK OPS: COVERT 
ACTION, FOREIGN POLICY, AND DEMOCRACY (2000); JOHN PRADOS, PRESIDENTS’ SECRET 
WARS: CIA AND PENTAGON COVERT OPERATIONS FROM WORLD WAR II THROUGH THE 
PERSIAN GULF (1996); JOHN RANELAGH, THE AGENCY: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE CIA 
(1986); EVAN THOMAS, THE VERY BEST MEN: FOUR WHO DARED: THE EARLY YEARS OF THE 
CIA (1995); GREGORY F. TREVERTON, COVERT ACTION: THE LIMITS OF INTERVENTION IN THE 
POSTWAR WORLD (1987); TIM WEINER, LEGACY OF ASHES: THE HISTORY OF THE CIA (2007). 
 6. See infra Part I.D. 
 7. See BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 5–7 (2002). 
 8.   James Risen, An American Was Among the 6 Killed by U.S., Yemenis Say, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 8, 2002, at A1; Brent Sadler, In the Sights of a Joystick Killing Machine, CNN.com, June 9, 
2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/06/09/sadler.predator.btsc/index.html. 
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transmitted images, in real time, to an operator at Nellis Air Force Base in 
Nevada.10  The operator, seated in a non-descript office, controlled the aircraft 
with a joystick.11  Man and machine, based on prior tips, searched for a target 
on the ground—a lone vehicle racing through the desert outside of Sana.12  
After the operator spotted the target, he used a remote control to deploy a 
Hellfire missile at supersonic speed.13  Within seconds, the vehicle, its driver, 
and all the passengers were obliterated.14 
In this way, a group of six al Qaeda members were killed.15  Included in 
the strike was Senyan al-Harthi, their leader.16  Having entered a brave new 
world after 9/11, they did not know what hit them.  They were not given any 
warning or any opportunity to surrender.  All in all, it was one victory for 
Team America, one defeat for the international terrorists. 
As a method against the terrorists, the strike from the sky was cleaner than 
captures, renditions, or detentions.  Whether or not the Americans gave the 
Yemeni government advanced notice of the strike, there were legitimate 
concerns about cooperation in a country where there is widespread support for 
al Qaeda.17 
Al-Harthi’s group was the unsuspecting prey of a new American killer: the 
Predator drone.18  The Predator kills suspected terrorists who do not wear 
uniforms on traditional battlefields.  Originally developed for overhead 
surveillance,19 the Predator has become a key part of America’s strategy of 
taking the battle to the terrorists.20  The Predator, in its armed and updated 
version, is about America being on offense. 
Not all covert action, however, is as spellbinding as the silent Predator.  
The Predator is just a recent example of the third option between diplomats 
sending notes and Marines hitting the shores.  Between diplomacy and combat, 
the CIA does many things on the dark side.  Some categories within its covert 
 
 9. Risen, supra note 8. 
 10. Sadler, supra note 8. 
 11. Id. 
 12. David Johnston & David E. Sanger, Hunt for Suspects: Fatal Strike in Yemen Was Based 
on Rules Set Out by Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2002, at A16. 
 13. Risen, supra note 8. 
 14. Johnston & Sanger, supra note 12. 
 15. Risen, supra note 8 (noting that one of the six people killed in the attack was a United 
States citizen). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Greg Miller & Josh Meyer, CIA Missile in Yemen Kills 6 Terror Suspects, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 2, 2002, at A1. 
 18. Josh Meyer, CIA Expands Use of Drones in Terror War, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at 
A4. 
 19. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT:  FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 189 (2004). 
 20. Meyer, supra note 18; see also Priest, supra note 1. 
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action arsenal are political action, propaganda, paramilitary actions, and 
economic subversion.  The CIA, since its creation, has taken on a shroud of 
secrecy to fix foreign elections,21 plant stories in the foreign press,22 supply 
insurgents who fight against our enemies,23 help American hostages escape 
from captivity,24 and much more.  For American covert action, there is a wide 
range of themes and variations.  Or, as a former CIA manager noted, “If one is 
to comprehend what lies behind this bland definition, one must look to the 
record of what the CIA has actually done under the orders of successive 
Presidents of the United States.”25 
To go beyond a bland definition, this section reviews some covert actions 
since World War II.26  Of particular interest to the two sets of questions about 
current covert action are the processes the Executive Branch has used in 
approving covert actions and the role Congress has played in watching over 
them. 
A. Political Action in Italy 
Although the Axis and Allied powers signed armistices in 1945, the 
international conflict continued.  Two allies during the war, the United States 
and the Soviets, morphed into vicious adversaries.  Their battles, however, no 
longer took place between tanks, troops, boats, and planes.  Their battles took 
place in the shadows.  For the shadow war, the CIA was created in 1947, one 
prong to the Truman Administration’s policy of Soviet containment made 
famous by George Kennan’s essay under the pseudonym “X.”27 
Even after the Soviets cut a line from Stettin to Trieste, Stalin was not 
satisfied.  He wanted more of the world.  Not fully deterred by America’s 
temporary monopoly over nuclear weapons, the Soviets continued to provoke.  
As they exerted more influence through local Communist parties in Germany, 
France, and Italy, it became clear to American policymakers that something 
 
 21. Ray S. Cline, Covert Action as Presidential Prerogative, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
357, 360–63 (1989). 
 22. See id. 
 23. Loch K. Johnson, On Drawing a Bright Line for Covert Operations, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 
284, 300–01 (1992). 
 24. See Antonio J. Mendez, CIA Goes Hollywood: A Classic Case of Deception, STUDIES IN 
INTELLIGENCE, Winter 1999–2000, at 2, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-
study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter99-00/art1.html. 
 25. Cline, supra note 21, at 360. 
 26. As the following section reveals, much of American covert action has been targeted 
against the Soviets and their proxies.  Now that the Cold War is over, covert action is being 
updated to deal with new threats. 
 27. See X, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 566 (1947). 
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more was needed to address the threat.28  America’s diplomats and generals, in 
short order, agreed that the freedom of Western Europe depended on exposing 
and countering Soviet machinations.29 
Italy, battered by years of hot war, was very weak.30  To prevent Italy from 
falling to the Soviets, a newly formed National Security Council (NSC)—in its 
first top secret report—concluded that: 
The United States should make full use of its political, economic and, if 
necessary, military power in such manner as may be found most effective to 
assist in preventing Italy from falling under the domination of the USSR either 
through external armed attack or through Soviet-dominated Communist 
movements within Italy . . . .31 
Economic assistance, as a part of the Marshall Plan, helped attain 
America’s goal in Italy.32  Even so, the NSC recognized that spreading money 
around was not sufficient to suppress the Soviets.33  For this reason, the NSC 
also recommended that the United States “[a]ctively combat Communist 
propaganda in Italy by an effective United States information program and by 
all other practicable means.”34  These “other practicable means” were later 
defined as covert actions. 
 
 28. See Cline, supra note 21, at 360–62 (citing 3 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN 
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: WESTERN EUROPE 724–89 (1974)); cf. S. REP. NO. 94-755, 
at 40 (1976) (noting that federal intelligence agencies used “aggressive covert actions” to disrupt 
domestic Communist Party activities). 
 29. Cline, supra note 21, at 360 n.10 (“[A]mong the officials who argued that the United 
States had to fight, covertly as well as overtly, against such subversive efforts sponsored by the 
Soviet Union were Secretary of State George C. Marshall, probably the most distinguished 
statesman to emerge from World War II; Secretary of War Robert Patterson; Secretary of Defense 
James Forrestal; George Kennan, Director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff[;] and 
not least, President Harry S. Truman.”). 
 30. See DAUGHERTY, supra note 5, at 116 (stating that the “intelligence analysts foresaw a 
possible Communist victory in Italy in the forthcoming spring 1948 elections”—a result Kennan 
and the Truman Administration believed “would erode governments throughout Western 
Europe”). 
 31. A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: THE POSITION OF THE UNITED 
STATES WITH RESPECT TO ITALY, NSC 1/2, § 8 (Feb. 10, 1948). 
 32. MARK A. STOLER, GEORGE C. MARSHALL: SOLDIER-STATESMAN OF THE AMERICAN 
CENTURY 162–68 (1989). Officially called the European Recovery Program, the Marshall Plan 
(named after Secretary of State George C. Marshall) injected $17 billion worth of aid into the 
ailing post-war economies of Western Europe.  Id. at 165. The rationale was that economic health 
would produce political stability which, in turn, would prevent Europe from going communist.  
Id. at 162. (The Marshall Plan was also offered to the Soviet Union and the other eastern bloc 
countries, but it was rejected.)  Id. at 165. The Plan was a boon to American industry since the 
goods purchased were largely American and were transported to Europe on American merchant 
vessels.  Id. at 167. 
 33. NSC 1/2, supra note 31, at § 3. 
 34. See id. § 9(e). 
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The NSC also approved the “Coordination of Foreign Intelligence 
Measures,” which instructed the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and his 
operatives to carry out “covert psychological operations designed to counteract 
Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities” in Italy.35  In more specific terms, the 
Truman Administration sought to prevent the Italian Communist Party (PCI) 
from winning a plurality in the Italian Parliament.36  The CIA, taking up the 
challenge, used a special group (the Office of Special Operations) to ensure a 
favorable outcome in the Italian election scheduled for the spring of 1948.37 
The goal was to help those aligned with American interests as much as it 
was to hurt those opposed to American interests.38  The basics to winning 
elections—organizing political parties, putting up posters, and mobilizing civic 
organizations—were applied to the local scene.39  All over Italy, the Americans 
tried to match what the Soviets were doing.40  The CIA provided both technical 
and financial assistance to the Christian Democrats, other non-communist 
political parties, labor unions, and church groups, and provided stories to be 
planted in newspapers and journals throughout Italy.41  Some of the CIA’s 
more devious tactics included bribing officials and co-opting labor unions.42 
The CIA, in Italian political action, tried to leave few fingerprints on the 
assistance being provided.  That was how our Italian friends wanted it because, 
as with other covert actions, evidence of an American role would have exposed 
friendly Italians to retribution and reduced the program’s effectiveness.43  
Moreover, exposure would have supplied the Soviets with anti-American 
fodder as they attempted to expand their influence over Italy and the rest of 
Western Europe. 
The covert action in Italy proved successful at the Italian elections in April 
1948.44  In the Chicago way, some people may have voted more than once, and 
the dead may have come back to cast their ballots.  As a result, a democratic, 
pro-Western coalition won, the PCI was prevented from playing any role in the 
government, and Italy remained free.45 
 
 35. NSC 4-A (Dec. 9, 1947). 
 36. DAUGHERTY, supra note 5, at 117. 
 37. Cline, supra note 21, at 363 (citing RAY CLINE, THE CIA UNDER REAGAN, BUSH, AND 
CASEY 102 (1981)). 
 38. See WILLIAM E. COLBY, HONORABLE  MEN: MY LIFE IN THE  CIA 109, 115 (1978). 
 39. See id. at 115–20. 
 40. Id. at 119 (noting as an example, Washington wanted the ability to match Communist 
media abilities). 
 41. See Cline, supra note 21, at 362. 
 42. DAUGHERTY, supra note 5, at 120. 
 43. Cline, supra note 21, at 362. 
 44. Id. at 363 (citing CLINE, supra note 37, at 102). 
 45. Id. 
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Basking in America’s success, George Kennan, as Director of the State 
Department’s Policy Planning Staff, pushed for a political action unit, separate 
from the CIA’s collection and analysis units.46  Rather than rely on ad hoc 
efforts, he sought a permanent structure for covert action.  The Italian victory 
had convinced American policymakers that covert actions, no matter what 
agency or sub-group performed them, “were both practical and necessary to 
thwart Communism.”47  But neither the Defense Department nor the State 
Department wanted to be in charge of dirty tricks.  So, through National 
Security Directive 10/2, the Office of Special Projects was created on June 18, 
1948.48  The Office of Special Projects, renamed the Office of Policy 
Coordination (OPC) a few months later, was separate from the CIA’s 
espionage group, the Office of Special Operations (OSO).49  In fact, OPC 
received offices from the CIA but took direction from the State Department.50  
In this way, the split between covert action (OPC) and espionage (OSO) was 
accentuated by separate units. 
After the 1948 elections, the CIA extended its Italian political action to the 
1953 and the 1958 elections.51  While the CIA was instrumental in achieving 
wins in these elections, America’s successes in Italy depended more on Italian 
contributions than on American ones.  As Bill Colby described his role in the 
1958 election, years before he became DCI: “[T]his sort of influence could not 
be exerted just because we thought so and were supporting the effort.  It would 
have to depend on a close and cooperative working relationship with the 
Italians actually involved in the fray.”52  In a most positive version, the CIA 
helped harvest the seeds of democracy.  To Colby, it was very important that 
the covert action had this positive aspect.  As he summarized: “The underlying 
philosophy of the CIA was to be for a democratic Italy, not just against a 
Communist one.”53  Colby, in other words, strongly believed we needed to be 
fertilizers rather than spoilers. 
In the new century, while the Communists are in check, political action 
continues as an option against terrorists.  American policymakers are probably 
still tempted to fix some foreign elections so that our friends come out on top.  
 
 46. Id. (citing CLINE, supra note 37, at 102).  In 1951, the OPC was dissolved and its staff 
transferred to the CIA’s Directorate of Plans.  Id. 
 47. DAUGHERTY, supra note 5, at 120 (quoting G.J.A. O’TOOLE, HONORABLE TREACHERY:  
A HISTORY OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE, ESPIONAGE, AND COVERT ACTION FROM THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION TO THE CIA 437 (1991)). 
 48. Id. at 122. 
 49. Id. at 123. 
 50. See PRADOS, supra note 5, at 81. 
 51. See COLBY, supra note 38, at 108–40. 
 52. Id. at 140. 
 53. Id. at 115. 
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When they submit to this temptation, they should try to be for the rule of law 
as much as they are against the terrorists and the regimes that support them. 
B. Cold War Propaganda: Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty 
Building on its success in Italy, the CIA extended covert action to Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union.  Two programs, Radio Free Europe (RFE) and 
Radio Liberty (RL), part of what CIA manager Frank Wisner called his 
“Mighty Wurlitzer,” are famous.54  It is not clear from the historical record 
whether these programs were conceived at the White House or the CIA.55  
Whatever their source, the CIA cultivated RFE and RL for many years.  
Eventually, when the American support became too transparent, these 
programs were shifted to an overt status.56 
Before the shift, the CIA did what it could to hide its support for RFE and 
RL.57  The hidden support increased legitimacy with audiences and prevented 
RFE/RL employees from being branded spies.58  For cover, RFE and RL 
pretended they were funded by private sources.59  Thus, in the war of ideas 
with the Soviet Union, the CIA relied on RFE and RL to broadcast behind the 
Iron Curtain, past the Communist censors.60  Otherwise, the Communist 
governments were presenting an official—and distorted—version of events in 
the region and the rest of the world.61 
RFE and RL, to keep their audience’s attention, mixed in music with the 
news as well as segments that strived to preserve non-Russian cultures within 
 
 54. See RANELAGH, supra note 5, at 216; Cline, supra note 21, at 363–64 & n.29 (noting 
that the CIA implemented RFE in 1950, and a year later created the companion broadcasting 
service RL). 
 55. See, e.g., SIG MICKELSON, AMERICA’S OTHER VOICE: THE STORY OF RADIO FREE 
EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY 4, 11 (1983) (noting that RFE and RL, while having “carefully 
concealed origins,” were likely “conceived by senior officials of the Department of State, the 
Department of Defense, and the intelligence community”); see also GENE SOSIN, SPARKS OF 
LIBERTY: AN INSIDER’S MEMOIR OF RADIO LIBERTY 1–2 (1999) (attributing RL to “[v]isionary 
American statesmen under President Harry Truman in the State and Defense Departments” along 
with the initiative of George F. Kennan, the policy planning advisor to the Secretary of State after 
the war). 
 56. See Cline, supra note 21, at 364. 
 57. Id. at 364–65. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Cf.  DAUGHERTY, supra note 5, at 74 (“Although funded and run covertly by the CIA for 
a number of years before being overtly managed by the United States Information Service, there 
was never much doubt among listeners as to the sponsoring government.”). 
 60. Cline, supra note 21, at 364; DAUGHERTY, supra note 5, at 73–74.  Propaganda that 
disseminates accurate information is called “white” propaganda and is “used to present to foreign 
audiences the originating government’s positions on issues, to explain policy decisions, to 
provide news unavailable from the local media, and generally to put a human face on the country 
and its people to the world.”  Id. at 75. 
 61. DAUGHERTY, supra note 5, at 73–74. 
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the Soviet Union.62  The bulk of RFE and RL employees were political 
refugees from the Soviet bloc.63  Not only could these people speak the 
languages of the region, but they also understood the nuances of their listeners 
back home.  Their broadcasts, from studios safely outside the Iron Curtain, 
overcame jamming and other technical obstacles.64 
Since RFE and RL developed many loyal listeners, the CIA considered 
these two programs a success.65  But, unlike the results of an Italian election, 
marked by winners and losers at the polls, it was difficult to measure the 
effects of these broadcasts.66  Further, it was next to impossible to analyze how 
propaganda compared to other types of covert action. 
The stakes in propaganda are not as high as other forms of covert action, 
such as support to insurgents, because propaganda is less likely to trigger 
violence from our adversaries.  That is an obvious upside.  The downside, 
commensurate with propaganda’s low risk, is its limited effect.  On balance, 
both RFE and RL served in the psychological war against the Soviets: 
disseminating accurate information, neutralizing Soviet disinformation, and 
pressuring Communist regimes.67 
It is clear, in retrospect, that RFE and RL deserve some credit for helping 
win the Cold War.  Indeed, many leaders in newly independent states credited 
these two CIA programs.68  Today, in a variation on a Cold War theme, 
American propaganda has probably turned to winning the hearts and minds of 
the Islamic world. 
C. Cold War Coups 
In the Cold War’s early days, the CIA concentrated on political action and 
propaganda, a modesty that made sense for an agency that worked in 
temporary offices in Washington.69  In the first battles against the Soviets, the 
CIA’s work was decidedly less violent (and less expensive) than 
countermeasures from the Department of Defense.  Later, CIA forays into Iran 
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and Guatemala changed the division of labor between the CIA and the military 
as American policymakers became more fearful about the Soviet threat. 
1. Operation Ajax 
By 1952, the covert action unit (OPC) and the espionage unit (OSO) were 
combined into a Directorate of Plans at the CIA.70  In that year, Mohammed 
Mossadegh’s election as Prime Minister of Iran alarmed those opposed to the 
Soviets.71  Although historians will forever debate how far Mossadegh really 
tilted to the left, the British, and later the Americans, considered his ties to the 
Iranian Tudeh (or Communist) Party and his nationalizing of the British oil 
concession to have gone too far.72  The British convinced many countries to 
join them in a boycott of Iranian oil, and the British intelligence services 
reached out to the CIA.73  Step by step, the Americans and the British moved 
toward a decision that Mossadegh had to go.74  Because political action and 
propaganda, by themselves, were insufficient for the task, President 
Eisenhower soon gave the green light for a coup.75 
The CIA took the lead on the coup, encouraged and aided by the British, 
who were fixed on regaining their Iranian oil assets.76  But the stakes were not 
only financial.  Doing nothing risked Mossadegh going Communist.77  Doing 
something, as with most conflicts during the Cold War, risked conflict with the 
Russians.  Despite these risks, there is little evidence that the American 
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Executive Branch consulted with Congress on the Iranian covert action.78  That 
was a sign of the times. 
Kermit Roosevelt, the grandson of Teddy Roosevelt and an operative with 
Middle East experience, made several trips to Iran to foment a coup.79  (The 
Americans and British expected that the Shah of Iran, more aligned with 
Western interests, could reassert power once the Prime Minister was ousted 
from office.)  At first, things did not go so well for Kermit Roosevelt and the 
rest of his CIA team.  After the original plan for the coup leaked to the Prime 
Minister, the Shah took exile in Iraq.80  Undeterred, Roosevelt conceived 
another plan, coined “Operation Ajax,” with two prongs.  First, Roosevelt paid 
hundreds of Iranians to intimidate Mossadegh’s supporters through 
demonstrations and other street tactics.81  Second, having identified Iranian 
military leaders with strong loyalties to the Shah, Roosevelt trained and 
directed them to take over local radio stations that, in turn, transmitted attacks 
on the Prime Minister.82  The coup, the second time around, was an easy 
success.  In exchange for a modest American investment,83 the Iranian people 
turned on Mossadegh.84  Very few lives were lost, Mossadegh was ousted, and 
the Shah returned to his throne.85 
Operation Ajax, no doubt, was a short-term success.  The coup stifled 
Soviet expansion into Iran and preserved Western control over Iran’s oil and 
gas.86  Thus, Kermit Roosevelt, in creating his own legend, looked back on 
Iran with pride.  Yet, Roosevelt understood, even if his superiors did not, that 
the Iranian success stemmed as much from good luck as it did from the CIA’s 
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mastery.87  For this reason, Roosevelt, when asked to apply Ajax to other 
countries, warned that coups could not solve all American problems.88  
Notwithstanding Roosevelt, the White House was more inclined to credit “the 
Agency’s role as far more determinative and decisive than it was.”89 
Closer to the present, Iranians still remember the coup in their country.  
Many argue that American meddling in 1953 contributed to the Iranian 
Revolution and to the taking of American hostages from 1979 until 1981.90  In 
fairness, it may be too much to expect policymakers and their operators to 
foresee all the ripples to their actions.  Yes, covert action must complement 
other aspects of American foreign policy.  But strategic planning, on coups or 
foreign policy, is a luxury for those who deal with constant crisis. 
2. Operation SUCCESS 
After Mossadegh, CIA-sponsored coups became a generic export of sorts.  
A year after the Iranian coup, the CIA flexed its paramilitary muscle on 
Operation SUCCESS.91  This time, President Eisenhower set his sights on the 
Guatemalan President, Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán.92  Since his election, Arbenz 
had pursued ambitious agrarian reform, attempting to reduce the influence of 
United States corporations including the United Fruit Company.93  Apparently 
Arbenz had not learned the Mossadegh lesson: a Third-World leader who 
expropriated Western holdings was asking for trouble.  Even more menacing 
than President Arbenz’s expropriations were his links to the Guatemalan 
 
 87. DAUGHERTY, supra note 5, at 137 (“The success of [Ajax] stemmed from just the right 
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 88. Id.  In a final report, Roosevelt explained that if “we, the CIA, are ever going to try 
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 89. Id. at 137. 
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Enlightenment, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 341, 401 n.215 (2007). 
 91. See STEPHEN SCHLESINGER & STEPHEN KINZER, BITTER FRUIT: THE UNTOLD STORY 
OF THE AMERICAN COUP IN GUATEMALA 109 (1982).  Under President Truman, a coup called 
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attitude toward the country. Id. at 102–03. Operation Success was so named to reflect the 
renewed optimism of its creators.  Id. at 109. 
 92. Id. at 138–39; Cline, supra note 21, at 365–66. 
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Alfonso Bauer Paiz, Minister of Labor and Economy under Arbenz, expressed that “[a]ll the 
achievements of the [United Fruit Company] were made at the expense of the impoverishment of 
the country and by acquisitive practices. . . .  The United Fruit Company is the principal enemy of 
the progress of Guatemala, of its democracy and of every effort directed at its economic 
liberation.”  Id. at 72–73. 
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Communist Party.94  So Eisenhower, unwilling to risk a “Soviet beachhead in 
our hemisphere,”95 called on the CIA, cheaper and seemingly more effective 
than the military. 
For the Guatemala project, the CIA established an operations center in 
Florida.96  This center helped arm and train a “Liberation Army” under the 
command of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, exiled from the Guatemalan 
Army.97  The Guatemala project was not limited to paramilitary assistance, 
however.  American businessmen were convinced to exert economic 
pressure.98  Radio propaganda and leaflets stirred up trouble.99  And military 
aid was distributed to other countries in the region, 100 creating a comparative 
disadvantage for Guatemala.101 
After a back-and-forth string of events, the rebel army deployed itself into 
Guatemala in 1954.102  But they did not take the capital in a snap.  When they 
bogged down, the CIA provided them with six Thunderbolt P-47 fighter planes 
and three P-51 fighter-bombers.103  The CIA also recruited pilots to fly from a 
staging ground in Nicaragua.104  The supplies and the recruitment were much 
more than the CIA had provided during the Iranian coup.  Air support turned 
the situation to the rebels’ advantage, and the CIA-sponsored broadcasts 
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created the impression of a much larger rebel army. 105  Some in the 
Guatemalan military, wavering in their support for President Arbenz, lost their 
nerve.  After an entire garrison surrendered to the rebels, President Arbenz 
rushed into exile.106 
Once again, the CIA had gotten its way.  Arbenz was out of Guatemala, 
and an American puppet was in.  Although the coup was a short-term success, 
it exacerbated anti-American sentiment in Latin America, confirming that the 
Americans would do anything to protect their profits. 107  Further, it set the 
foundation for forty years of Guatemalan dictatorship and unleashed the dark 
forces of Guatemalan society, not easily managed or controlled from afar.108  
Even so, it led the Eisenhower Administration (and future administrations) to 
see covert action as an easy solution.109 
Covert action, rather than complementing diplomacy and other instruments 
of American power, became a cheap substitute for policy.  In short, the Iranian 
and Guatemalan experiences spoiled American leaders.  As William Daugherty 
aptly notes, “these two successes left in their wake an attitude of hubris within 
the Agency . . . .”110 
3. Nicaragua and the Iran-Contra Affair 
More than twenty years later, in a variation on the Guatemalan theme, the 
Reagan Administration returned to Central America.  Restoring Cold War 
lines, Reagan backed a rebel army against the leftist government in 
Nicaragua.111  But Reagan’s Contras, unlike Armas in Guatemala, could not 
trick themselves into victory since the Sandinistas maintained better control of 
their forces.112  Stubborn, and in the face of congressional restrictions, Reagan 
continued to back the Contras.113  The friction between the President and 
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Congress at home led to investigations, hearings, and indictments, events 
which prompted reforms that now serve as foundation for Congress’s 
expanded role on covert action.114 
Today, fomenting coups is not an attractive option for countering terrorists.  
The international community is not keen on a superpower meddling in other 
countries.  And in places such as Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, 
America’s problems have less to do with the governments than with the people 
there.  In a basic sense, the Iran-Contra affair showed that successful coups in 
Iran and Guatemala were relics of the past. 
Back in the 1950s, the decade ended with perceived successes on covert 
action.  The CIA was proud of what it had accomplished, sometimes behind 
the scenes, sometimes on center stage, in Italy, Iran, and Guatemala.  (A failed 
coup in 1957 against President Sukarno of Indonesia did not seem to trouble 
policymakers or the public.115)  The 1960s, however, did not start off so well.  
At the beginning of the decade, just before a planned summit between 
President Dwight Eisenhower and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, the 
Soviets shot Francis Gary Powers from his U-2 surveillance plane.116  Soon, 
things got much worse in a different part of the world. 
D. Anti-Castro Plots: Bay of Pigs and Operation MONGOOSE 
In Iran and Guatemala, the CIA established theme and variation: if the 
Americans did not like the leader of a Third World country—if he were too 
close to the Soviets or might cozy up to the Soviets—then he was pushed from 
power.  When overt measures were too costly or too dangerous, covert action 
 
 114. See Christopher M. Ford, Intelligence Demands in a Democratic State: Congressional 
Intelligence Oversight, 81 TUL. L. REV. 721, 753–54 (2007).  Ford writes that: 
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could take care of a problem.117  Going into the 1960s, a big problem for 
American policymakers was Fidel Castro, riding high from his military victory 
over Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista.118 
Almost as soon as Castro took power in 1959, the Eisenhower 
Administration plotted his demise.  The CIA’s main project, Operation 
ZAPATA, armed and trained Cuban exiles in Guatemala.119  (Since the leftists 
had been removed in Guatemala, the new Guatemalan leaders could repay their 
debt to the CIA by allowing their territory to serve as a staging point.)  On top 
of the paramilitary project, the CIA added sabotage, political action, and anti-
Castro propaganda.120  Richard Helms, looking back on his CIA career, 
summarizes the audacity of the Cuban operation: 
President Eisenhower approved the Agency plan involving propaganda, the 
creation of a unified Cuban opposition to Castro, and the formation of a cadre 
of some twenty exiles trained in guerrilla tactics—infiltration, sabotage, and 
communications.  This group was, in turn, to develop a hundred or more 
Cuban agents who were to be infiltrated into Cuba.121 
Although Eisenhower did not necessarily articulate his fears through a 
“domino theory,” he did believe that Castro could cause other countries to go 
Communist.122  Back then, most everything was considered through a binary 
lens: a loss for us was a gain for them, and vice versa. 
During Operation ZAPATA, Allen Dulles was the DCI, Richard Bissell, 
the director of operations.123  Dulles, a legendary case officer, had served in the 
Office of Strategic Services, the precursor to the CIA, during World War II.124  
Bissell’s claim to fame was developing the U-2 spy plane.125  Between Dulles 
and Bissell, preparations for the Cuban invasion moved forward during the 
Eisenhower Administration and continued into the next administration.126  
Again, Richard Helms, who favored foreign intelligence for the CIA over 
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covert action, was not very kind in assessing his peers: “The only venue for a 
plan of this scope is a Hollywood motion picture studio.”127 
The new president, John F. Kennedy, briefed by Dulles and Bissell during 
the transition, did have an opportunity to call off the Cuban operation.128  
Refusing to approve a covert action, of course, is one thing.  Canceling 
something approved by a prior president who had been a supreme allied 
commander during a world war was quite another.  Dulles and Bissell, much 
like a later DCI who spoke of “slam dunks” concerning Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction,129 assured the new president the invasion would succeed.130  So 
President Kennedy, clinging to his own notion of plausible denial, did not stop 
the Cuban operation.131 
Nothing at the time, neither a statute nor an executive order, required the 
NSC or any other body to deliberate on the matter.  Further, President Kennedy 
tended toward more centralized, informal decisionmaking.132  As a result of 
this preference and the CIA’s secrecy, people who could have spoken out 
about flaws to the operation—experts at the State Department, the Defense 
Department, and the CIA—were kept out of the loop.133  These people should 
have questioned the change in the proposed landing site to a swampy part of 
Cuba’s coastline as well as the assumption that the Cuban people would join 
the insurrection.134  Even so, an irony to the CIA’s secrecy is that Castro may 
have known about the attack well in advance because the Cuban intelligence 
services may have picked up the bits and pieces about an invasion in the open 
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 130. DAUGHERTY, supra note 5, at 155. 
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sources of the American press.135  Plus, they may have had secret sources in a 
brothel where the Cuban exiles made frequent visits from their Guatemalan 
training ground. 
On April 17, 1961, despite the flaws to the operation, over 1400 Cuban 
rebels landed on the beach at the Bay of Pigs.136  Armed with American 
weapons, they expected to wade through the swamps, hike over the mountains, 
and plant their flag in Havana.  Although greatly outnumbered by Castro’s 
forces, they hoped the news of their landing would cause Castro’s forces to 
switch to their side or to let them be.  Either way, that was wishful thinking.  
The rebels were confronted by heavy opposition, armed with Soviet 
weapons.137  The rebels were shelled and bombed from land and air.138  Castro, 
unlike Mossadegh, kept the lid on his country.  Castro, unlike Arbenz, did not 
lose his nerve.139 
For the Cuban rebels, pinned on the beach, something else needed to be 
done.  The intelligence community, in a rush, informed President Kennedy of 
the brutal beating the rebels were taking.140  Some of Kennedy’s advisers, in a 
late night cabinet meeting, expected American air strikes to save them.141  
Such an attack would have shown, despite official denials, that the United 
States was behind the rebels.  For this reason, President Kennedy, still opposed 
to an outright military attack against Cuba and fearful of escalation, refused the 
recommended air strikes from an American carrier.142  All that he permitted 
were some limited strikes by rebel pilots, flying planes out of Nicaragua.143  In 
effect, the rebels on the ground in Cuba were left to go it alone.  Two days 
after their ill-fated landing, more than one hundred were dead.144  The rest, 
shortly thereafter, were captured and imprisoned.145 
In hindsight, as much as the rebels hated Kennedy for betrayal, his fear that 
the Bay of Pigs could escalate into a larger conflict with the Soviet Union was 
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not farfetched.146  The Cuban Missile Crisis, later in his administration, proved 
that Cuba had the potential to take the United States to nuclear war.147 
The Bay of Pigs balanced away the CIA’s ledger of success on coups in 
Iran and Guatemala.  Though President Eisenhower had started the project, 
President Kennedy accepted the embarrassment.148  Soon after, President 
Kennedy is reported to have said that he wanted to splinter the CIA into a 
thousand pieces.149  Splintered or not, Operation ZAPATA, in a few ugly days, 
marked the “end of the golden age of covert action.”150  Even today, as shown 
in Robert DeNiro’s movie The Good Shepherd, the Bay of Pigs stands for the 
failure of American covert action and the limits of American power. 
President Kennedy took the Bay of Pigs personally.151  As he recovered 
between rounds, Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell took the fall for him, and the 
rest of the CIA stayed in the President’s corner.152  Kennedy battled Castro in 
the later rounds, and Operation MONGOOSE was a new punch to take down 
the Cuban menace.153  For the new covert action, Brigadier General Edward G. 
Lansdale replaced Bissell as Chief of Operations.154  Against Castro, Lansdale 
drew on his counter-insurgency experience in Asia to manage a multi-faceted 
program of paramilitary activity, economic sabotage, and propaganda.155  That 
was not all, though. 
The United States also tried the direct measure of killing Castro.156  Some 
plots had taken place before the Bay of Pigs, some after.157  Whatever the time 
frame, all of the plots were crazy.  Thus, in less than two decades, from Italy to 
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Cuba, the CIA’s covert action devolved from non-violent measures such as 
political action and propaganda to the most violent measures. 
To this day, it is not clear whether President Kennedy specifically ordered 
any hits.158  It is also not clear how widely the hits were discussed at the CIA’s 
senior levels. The paper trail at the White House or at CIA headquarters is just 
not there.  What is clear, however, is that in the absence of written orders from 
the President, there were many winks and nods from the Oval Office all the 
way down to the operatives in the field. 
For the Cuban operations, President Kennedy trusted his brother as liaison 
between the White House and the CIA.159  After the Bay of Pigs, Bobby 
immersed himself in the dirty details of American intelligence activities, and 
he must have been at least aware of some assassination plots.160  Such work by 
an Attorney General challenges those who view the Justice Department as a 
general check on illegality and imprudence in covert action.  President Carter, 
reacting to abuses revealed in the 1970s, formally included the Attorney 
General in the process.161  President Reagan, reacting to the perception of 
Carter’s fecklessness and legalistic style, did not include the Attorney General 
as a rule.162  But back in the Kennedy Administration, as a part of a “Special 
Group Augmented” at the NSC, the Attorney General actually approved and 
ran intelligence activities.163  Bobby, all in all, did very different things from 
oversight.164 
While Bobby Kennedy insisted the FBI do more to combat organized 
crime, the CIA, deeper in the shadows, reached out to the mob on assassination 
plots against Castro.165  The Kennedy brothers, whether they were aware of it 
or not, were handing mobsters an argument that they should not be investigated 
or prosecuted, because of their assistance to American foreign policy.  Rife 
was the potential for blackmail. 
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From 1960–1965, the CIA took at least eight different steps toward 
assassinating the Cuban leader.166  The most conventional plots depended on 
rifles, tainted cigars, and pens that injected poisons.167  The least conventional 
plots relied on contaminated wet suits and seashells filled with explosives to 
interfere with Castro’s scuba-diving.168 
In other aspects of MONGOOSE, the CIA coordinated with Cuban exiles 
in Florida to discredit Castro’s regime.169  Further, the CIA considered a 
biological attack on Cuban crops and spreading word to Cuba’s large Catholic 
population that Christ would return as soon as Castro was gone.170  But, no 
matter how much money the Kennedy Administration spent, no matter the 
ingenuity and depravity of the schemes, the CIA failed to take care of the 
Cuban problem.171  Eventually, the Kennedy brothers were themselves 
assassinated.  And Fidel, whose beard grew long and gray, stayed for decades 
in the American backyard, a Communist still walking—even after the Soviet 
Union’s demise.172 
Despite the lack of success against Fidel Castro, the CIA today may 
actually be back in the business of targeted killing.  As the 2002 Predator strike 
in Yemen showed, the targets may now be suspected terrorists instead of heads 
of state.173  And the battlefield may have shifted from Cuba to Asia.  While the 
technology has been updated, the expected results are just as violent as they 
were in the 1960s: kill them before they kill us. 
E. Anti-Allende Operations in Chile 
Cuba was not the only problem in Latin America.  During the Kennedy 
Administration, the CIA conducted political action in Chile that facilitated the 
Alliance for Progress, an initiative in Latin America “to promote the growth of 
democratic institutions.”174  The CIA, trying to keep its role hidden, provided 
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financial support to the Chilean right-wing party, to the Christian Democrats, 
and to the Chilean Radical Party (PR).175  The goal, a variation on the one 
attained in Italy, was to keep the Communists in check.176  In that regard, the 
Chilean covert action was quite successful initially.177  Following the 1963 
elections, the PR was the largest political party in Chile—keeping Socialists 
and Communists out of power.178 
The CIA’s political action in Chile continued, essentially unchanged 
through the Johnson Administration.179  Next, the Nixon Administration 
expanded the covert action in Chile after American intelligence reported that 
the Soviets were maneuvering to tip the 1970 presidential election their way.180  
President Nixon, hoping against hope, sought to prevent the National Party and 
the Christian Democrats, both acceptable to him, from splitting their votes and 
handing victory to the leftist, Salvador Allende.181  Some quick political action, 
overt and covert, was conducted, but by the time of the Chilean election, the 
White House’s fears came true: Jorge Alessandri and Radomiro Tomic split 
their votes and Allende came out on top.182  Allende, however, was short of a 
majority necessary for an outright victory.183 
Upon Allende’s victory in the first round, President Nixon decided to do 
what he could to undermine him.184  Because the President himself had taken 
the initiative, there was no need for extensive consultation or debate within the 
government.  The NSC and Congress were of marginal importance to Nixon as 
he summoned the DCI, Richard Helms, to the White House for orders.185  
According to Helms’s notes from the meeting, the President, as a part of a two-
track covert action, wanted the Chilean economy to “scream.”186  To do so, 
Nixon expected the CIA to put its best people on the job.187  In response, 
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Helms and his CIA, under great pressure, did what they could in two months to 
put off Allende’s assumption of power in the second round of the election.188 
Track I of the covert action, through propaganda and political action, 
attempted to block the Chilean Congress from confirming Allende as 
President.189  If possible, the CIA would bribe members of the Chilean 
Senate.190  Track II, kept secret from the State Department as well as the 
American Ambassador in Santiago, tried to foster a military coup before 
Allende’s inauguration.191  The CIA, mixing foreign intelligence activities with 
covert action, deepened contacts with three groups opposed to Allende within 
the Chilean military.192  Everybody, friend or foe, was scrambling in Chile.  
One group, to the CIA’s shame, actually used American weapons provided by 
the CIA to kidnap Rene Schneider, an influential army chief of staff opposed 
to a coup.193  Schneider died from wounds he took defending himself from the 
attackers—but the coup did not materialize.194 
Despite Tracks I and II, Allende assumed power by a lopsided vote in the 
Chilean Senate.195  Nixon, refusing to be the president who “lost” Chile to the 
Communists, continued the efforts against Allende.  Again, he ordered the CIA 
to “disrupt the Chilean economy.”196  The goal of this disruption was to create 
enough unrest and pain so that the Chilean military would step in and oust 
Allende.197 
Sure enough, by 1973, Chile was in an economic crisis.  The middle class 
was shrinking, labor strikes in the copper and transportation sectors were 
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crippling the economy,198 and, to the dismay of many in the Chilean military, 
Allende was getting cozy with Castro.199  As a result, General Augusto 
Pinochet, apparently without any prodding from the CIA, organized a coup 
against Allende.200  With tanks in the street, the coup plotters stormed the 
presidential palace, and Allende was killed, either by his own hand or by a 
bomb that was dropped on him.201  On balance, although the CIA played no 
direct role in the coup,202 having no blood on its hands, earlier CIA activities 
likely “created the conditions” that led to Allende’s demise.203 
The aftermath of the coup was not too good for the Chilean people.  Under 
Pinochet, the country went through a long period of dictatorship in which 
many people disappeared.204  But, unlike what happened in Iran after the CIA 
coup there, the end of the Chilean story was a transition to democracy along 
with positive U.S.-Chilean relations.205  Pinochet’s assumption of power ended 
the American justification for further covert action in Chile. 
Overall, between 1963 and 1974, separate from what the White House did 
on its own, the NSC approved thirty-three covert actions in Chile.206  Of these, 
only eight were briefed to Congress in any way.207  Those were the good old 
days for the CIA, before the Church Committee dug into abuses in Chile, 
Cuba, and other places.  However, before the rules for covert action changed to 
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address the Iran-Contra scandal, the Carter and Reagan Administrations had 
one last hurrah in Afghanistan. 
F. Supporting the Mujahedin in Afghanistan 208 
For centuries, Afghanistan was the grand prize in a great game between the 
British and the Russians, and even after the leading players changed, 
Afghanistan remained important to the Cold War struggle.  For the Soviets, 
Afghanistan put them one country away from the warm water ports and the 
vast petroleum reserves in Iran.  To counter the Soviets, President Carter 
approved a covert action on July 3, 1979, for “a small scale propaganda 
campaign publicizing Soviet activities in Afghanistan; indirect financial 
assistance to the insurgents; direct financial assistance to Afghan émigré 
groups to support their anti-Soviet, anti-regime activities; non-lethal material 
assistance; weapons support; and a range of training and support options.”209  
Funded at a low level, this covert action was a means of “harassing”210 the 
Marxist government in Kabul and of aiding the Mujahedin, a loose collection 
of Afghan groups opposed to Soviet rule.211 
As the CIA became involved in Afghanistan, it was no stranger to fighting 
pseudo-wars through proxies.  During the Vietnam War, for example, the CIA 
responded to North Vietnamese operations in southeastern Laos by training 
and arming a force of over twenty thousand Laotians.212  Although this was 
labeled covert action, not direct military confrontation, the differences between 
the two were measured in degrees more than in kind.  In charge of CIA 
operations in Laos was Bill Colby, the future DCI, who was proud that the CIA 
was leaner and meaner than the American military in Vietnam.213  Some CIA 
officers, not keeping any distance from the battle, may have actually fought on 
the side of their local allies in Laos.  The CIA even ran an airline in the region, 
Air America, as a covert means of providing assistance to its proxies.214  Years 
later, through an approved covert action, the Americans tried to maintain a thin 
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and dangerous line between the intelligence function and the military function 
in Afghanistan. 
A few months after President Carter ordered limited covert action in 
Afghanistan, the Soviets, emboldened by America’s trouble in Iran, invaded 
Afghanistan to prop up their puppet.215  This invasion radically altered the 
American view of the world and, in turn, prompted President Carter to 
authorize $100 million in weapons for the Mujahedin.216  Even so, President 
Carter insisted that this assistance stay as secret as possible to avoid drawing 
the United States and our Pakistani allies into a larger conflict with the Soviets. 
After President Carter, President Reagan increased covert action in 
Afghanistan.  Along with Bill Casey, Reagan’s campaign manager turned DCI, 
President Reagan saw the Afghan program “as a way to deeply, if not fatally, 
wound the Soviet Union.”217  To that end, the United States channeled more 
than a billion dollars in assistance to the Mujahedin between 1986 and 1989, 
providing them with training and, later in the conflict, with several hundred 
shoulder-held, laser-guided Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.218  The Stingers, 
which were lethal in taking down Soviet helicopters, were significant in 
turning the situation to the Mujahedin’s advantage.219 
Eventually, the Soviets, wounded by a thousand bites, withdrew their 
troops from Afghanistan.  After years of conflict, the human toll amounted to 
fifty thousand dead Soviets, and close to two million dead Afghans.220  Since 
the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan was a key factor in the Soviet Union’s 
downward spiral, President Reagan, DCI Casey, and other American leaders 
looked back on the Afghan covert action with great satisfaction.221  Sometimes 
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the CIA worked, they said.  The Cold War, after all, had started and stopped 
with American successes in covert action. 
Against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the CIA had worked directly or 
indirectly with an array of Islamic fundamentalists, including Osama bin 
Laden.222  The CIA, as a part of its covert action, helped build tunnels outside 
of Kabul for storing weapons and for protecting Islamic troops.223  Years later, 
in a historical twist after 9/11, bin Laden and his forces used those tunnels and 
troops against the Americans.  And some of those Stingers may still be in bad 
hands. 
Hindsight, of course, provides the best vision.  From a perfect perspective, 
it was a mistake for the United States to cut support to the Mujahedin as soon 
as they defeated the Soviets.224  The Afghans felt betrayed, and our 
“withdrawal created a power vacuum that various clashing factions of 
Mujahedin sought to fill, the result of which was ‘banditry and 
lawlessness.’”225  In short, the aftermath was civil war, followed by vicious 
Taliban rule. 
Today, even after American successes against al Qaeda and the Taliban, 
even after significant American assistance, Afghanistan remains unstable.  The 
work there is far from done.  American policymakers, whether through open or 
covert means, are still inclined to aid their proxies and allies. 
G. Escape from Iran 
This chronology of covert action ends with a return to Iran.  By 1979, after 
months of protests and demonstrations, the Shah of Iran was in exile and the 
groups opposed to him were in power.226  On November 4, 1979, a group of 
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militants took over the United States embassy in Tehran.227  Radical clerics, 
including Ayatollah Khomeini, supported the takeover as a part of their 
strategy for consolidating power after the revolution.228  With Khomeini’s 
blessing, they held sixty-three diplomats and three additional Americans 
hostage.229 
During the takeover, six would-be hostages fled to the Canadian 
embassy.230  For their safety, the Canadians hid them while the American and 
Canadian governments, in secret, settled on a plan to extract them from Iran.231  
The Canadians, however, made their cooperation contingent on keeping the 
American Congress in the dark.232  Notice to Congress, the Canadians figured, 
greatly increased the chances that the rescue would leak to the public, 
something dangerous not only to the Americans but to all the personnel in the 
Canadian embassy.233 
President Carter, without any apparent reservation, accepted the Canadian 
condition.234  To carry out the mission, he called on the CIA.235  With 
presidential authorization, Antonio Mendez, an expert in disguises at the CIA, 
took charge of the covert action.236  For anybody, sneaking six Americans out 
of revolutionary Iran was not easy.  As Mendez later recounted, “[w]e needed 
to find a way to rescue six Americans with no intelligence background, and we 
would have to coordinate a sensitive plan of action with another US 
government department and with senior policymakers in the US and Canadian 
administrations.”237  Indeed, a full account of the Iranian covert action was not 
disclosed until the Agency’s fiftieth anniversary in 1997.238 
 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 14. 
 229. Id. at 198–99.  After two weeks of captivity, thirteen of the hostages, mainly African 
Americans and women, were released.  Charles G. Cogan, Desert One and Its Disorders, 67 J. 
MIL. HIST. 201, 208 (2003). 
 230. Canadian Caper Helps Americans Escape Tehran, (CBC television broadcast Jan. 28, 
1980), available at http://archives.cbc.ca/on_this_day/01/28/. 
 231. Id. 
 232. See Oversight Legislation, 1987: Hearings on S. 1721 and S. 1818 Before the Senate 
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 100th Cong. 209 (1988) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of 
Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, former DDCI under Stansfield Turner) (“[T]he Canadians 
indicated that if the Congress was to be informed, they wouldn’t cooperate.”).  Senator Jim 
McClure also stated that “[t]he Canadians said they would not help unless the administration 
promised not to notify Congress.”  See Jim McClure, Letter to the Editor, A 48-Hour Rule For 
Covert Operations? No, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1988, at A14. 
 233. Hearings, supra note 232. 
 234. See PRADOS, supra note 5, at 352. 
 235. Id. at 353. 
 236. See Mendez, supra note 24, at 2. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 2 (providing a thorough discussion of the operational planning). 
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The rescue required three months of planning.239  First, the CIA obtained 
Canadian passports for the six Americans and forged Iranian visas for them.240  
Next, Mendez devised “a cover so exotic that no one would imagine it was 
being used for operational purposes.”241  Mendez’s plan was to disguise 
himself and his six compatriots as a Hollywood production team that had been 
in Iran scouting a movie site.242  To be as authentic as possible, the CIA, with 
the help of a makeup consultant called “Jerome Calloway,” set up a motion 
picture company,243 leased a production suite,244 took out full-page ads in key 
trade papers,245 and purchased “a script with ‘sci-fi,’ Middle Eastern, and 
mythological elements.”246  With full attention to detail, Mendez arranged 
appropriate “pocket litter” for the six Americans.247  Mendez, who himself 
played the production manager, carried a “portfolio [that] had everything 
needed to sell even the most sophisticated investment banker on our movie.”248 
The “backstopping” all arranged, Mendez flew to Tehran.249  There, in 
secret, he met the six at the Canadian embassy, explained the plan, and 
described how to be “more ‘Hollywood.’”250  The transformations were 
dramatic.251  The otherwise conservative Bob Anders, for example, took on a 
new persona: 
Now, his snow-white hair was a “mod” blow dry.  He was wearing tight 
trousers with no pockets and a blue silk shirt unbuttoned down the front with 
 
 239. Id. at 14. 
 240. See id. at 4, 9. 
 241. Mendez, supra note 24, at 4.  Such an approach, although quite creative, was risky, 
because “legends hold up best when their details closely follow the actual experience or 
background of the user . . . [and] should be sufficiently dull so that [they do] not pique undue 
interest.”  Id.  That was not the case here. 
 242. See id. at 4–6.  Production companies from Hollywood often “travel around the world 
looking for the right street or hillside to shoot a particular scene.”  Id. at 5.  A production team 
usually consists of “a production manager, a cameraman, an art director, a transportation 
manager, a script consultant, an associate producer, a business manager, and a director.”  Id. at 4. 
 243. Id. at 5.  The production company was appropriately titled “Studio Six Productions.”  Id. 
 244. Id. at 5–6.  CIA contractors established Studio Six Productions in an old Columbia 
Studios lot in Hollywood.  Id.  Michael Douglas had just used this lot to produce the film The 
China Syndrome.  Id. at 5–6. 
 245. Id.  Full-page ads were taken out in Variety and The Hollywood Reporter.  Id. at 6. 
 246. Mendez, supra note 24, at 5–6.  “The script was based on an award-winning sci-fi novel 
with a complicated story line” and themes “about the glory of Islam.”  Id.  Calloway and Mendez 
chose the title “Argo” because it was the punch line of a profane knock-knock joke familiar to the 
group and because it had origins in mythology.  Id. 
 247. Id. at 7.  This included business cards, briefing papers, airline tickets, lapel pins, baggage 
stickers, and matchbooks from the Brown Derby Restaurant in Hollywood.  Id. 
 248. Id. at 8. 
 249. Id. at 10. 
 250. Id. at 12–13. 
 251. Mendez, supra note 24, at 12–13. 
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his chest hair cradling a gold chain and medallion.  With his topcoat resting 
across his shoulders like a cape, he strolled around the room with the flair of a 
Hollywood dandy.252 
The briefings complete, Mendez and the group were ready to leave.253  
Through an inside contact at the airport, they were provided with forged 
embarkation cards which made it seem as if they all had entered Iran as part of 
the production team.254  Though “traveling a bit light for Hollywood types,” 
they proceeded through the emigration checkpoint, boarded the flight, and flew 
away from Iran.255  As Mendez describes, reminiscent of Kermit Roosevelt’s 
earlier glory in Iran, the operation was “[a]s [s]mooth as [s]ilk.”256 
The Carter Administration did not consider informing Congress of the 
covert action—even in closed session—until the Americans returned home.257  
Even then, the Carter Administration hesitated.258  For the safety of the other 
Americans still hostage in Tehran, the Carter Administration did not want the 
rescue operation to go public.259  By accepting the Canadian condition for the 
rescue mission, President Carter arguably violated the express terms of the 
Hughes-Ryan Act,260 an important piece of legislation on covert action.  Here, 
the Iranian rescue mission is a final illustration of the tensions between the 
President’s power to get things done and Congress’s power to be informed of 
matters that could take the country to war.261  Back and forth, sometimes 
policy stretches the law, and sometimes the law stretches policy. 
 
 252. Id. at 13. 
 253. Id. at 13–14. 
 254. Id. at 12. 
 255. Id. at 14–15. 
 256. Mendez, supra note 24, at 14.  In fact, one airline manager approached Mendez to ask 
why he had not booked another airline—which would have arranged for red-carpet treatment.  Id. 
 257. See Hearings, supra note 232, at 220.  Then-Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci stated, 
“Now we did inform after the fact.”  Id.  He noted however, that “I was one of the decision-
makers [to withhold notification to Congress] and I would not have [given prior notice], in 
retrospect.  Because I think those people would still be there had we not agreed to withhold 
information.”  Id. 
 258. See PRADOS, supra note 5, at 353–54. 
 259. See Hearings, supra note 232, at 220. 
 260. See Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93–559, 
sec. 32, § 662, 88 Stat. 1795, 1804 (1974) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1976)) 
(requiring “timely” notice to the appropriate committees of Congress), repealed by Intelligence 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–88, 103 Stat. 429. 
 261. For example, as one commentator notes: 
Foreign powers or operatives, knowing that participation with the United States in a 
special activity requires rigid congressional notification procedures, may well refuse to 
extend their assistance.  In this way, rigid notification requirements interfere with the 
President’s ability to conduct foreign affairs, since they deny him the ability to receive 
such assistance. 
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II.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Although the historical frame to this Article started after World War II, it 
remains true that Presidents as far back as George Washington conducted 
covert action.262  Throughout American history, the legal justifications for 
covert action have varied.  Under a separation-of-powers analysis, three broad 
periods to American covert action can thus be identified. 
First, before the National Security Act of 1947,263 Presidents conducted 
covert actions based on Article II powers while Congress deferred.264  And the 
courts were nowhere close to the action.265  Although there is nothing explicit 
about covert action in the Constitution, Presidents inferred authority from such 
places as the Vesting Clause, the Commander-in-Chief Clause, the Treaty 
Clause, and from an implied executive privilege.266  As a result, covert actions 
 
David Everett Colton, Speaking Truth to Power: Intelligence Oversight in an Imperfect World, 
137 U. PA. L. REV. 571, 601 (1988) (citation omitted). 
 262. See ANDREW, supra note 138, at 6–12. 
 263. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 10 & 50 U.S.C.). 
 264.  See BRUCE D. BERKOWITZ  & ALLEN E. GOODMAN, STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE FOR 
AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY 25–26 (3d ed. 1989); CECIL V. CRABB, JR. & PAT M. HOLT, 
INVITATION TO STRUGGLE: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND FOREIGN POLICY 169–91 (1989); 
DAUGHERTY, supra note 5, at 91–92; LOCH K. JOHNSON, AMERICA’S SECRET POWER: THE CIA 
IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 8–9 (1989).  While these scholars generally agree that Congress 
rarely intruded into covert actions and other intelligence matters before the Cold War, recent 
scholarship challenges the consensus that Congress was uninvolved during this period.  See 
DAVID M. BARRETT, THE CIA AND CONGRESS: THE UNTOLD STORY FROM TRUMAN TO 
KENNEDY (2005). 
 265. See William S. Cohen, Congressional Oversight of Covert Actions: The Public’s Stake in 
the Forty-Eight Hour Rule, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 285, 291 (1989) (“[T]he courts have 
refused to draw hard and fast lines between the prerogatives of the two branches in this area.”). 
 266. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 2 (“[T]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America. . . .  The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy 
of the United States, and . . . He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, to make Treaties . . . .”).  Executive privilege refers to the President’s ability to keep 
internal debates secret and is often defended as important to protect national security and 
diplomacy.  See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707–08 (1974) (stating that the President 
has a constitutionally based presumptive privilege to withhold certain information relating to 
confidential conversations and correspondence necessary to protect the public interest).  The 
Constitution does not mention such authority, and the Supreme Court did not expressly consider 
the constitutionality and scope of the executive privilege until 1974.  Id.; see also DANIEL N. 
HOFFMAN, GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: A STUDY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS 4 (1981) (explaining that the Framers were very aware of, and 
relied on the vitality of, the executive privilege). 
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during the first period were subject to very little congressional or judicial 
oversight, if any.267 
During the second period, starting with Congress’s enactment of the 
National Security Act of 1947, it was argued—especially by those who did not 
completely accept inherent powers—that Congress had given the President 
authority to conduct covert action.  This argument rested on the “fifth 
function” to the CIA’s charter,268 on the authority for secret transfers of funds 
laid out in the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949,269 and on 
appropriations from Congress.270  Not everyone agreed, however, that 
Congress had given the President such authority.271  The wording to the CIA’s 
 
 267. See BARRY M. BLECHMAN, THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY: CONGRESS AND 
U.S. DEFENSE POLICY 139 (1990).  This period has been referred to as the era of “Congressional 
‘undersight.’” ).  Id. 
 268. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, § 102(d)(5), 61 Stat. 495, 498 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(d)(5) (2000)).  A fifth clause of the original NSA of 
1947 called for the CIA “to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence 
affecting the national security as the [NSC] may from time to time direct.”  Id. 
 269. Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81–110, 63 Stat. 208 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 403a–403w (2000 & Supp. V 2001–2006)).  Specifically, 50 U.S.C. § 
403f(a) (2000) provides that: 
In the performance of its functions, the Central Intelligence Agency is authorized to—(1) 
[t]ransfer to and receive from other Government agencies such sums as may be approved 
by the Office of Management and Budget . . . and any other Government agency is 
authorized to transfer to or receive from the Agency such sums without regard to any 
provisions of law limiting or prohibiting transfers between appropriations. Sums 
transferred to the Agency in accordance with this paragraph may be expended for the 
purposes and under the authority of sections 403a to 403s of this title without regard to 
limitations of appropriations from which transferred . . . . 
Id.  (emphasis added).  50 U.S.C. § 403j(b) (2000) further provides that: 
The sums made available to the Agency may be expended without regard to the 
provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds; and 
for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, such expenditures to be 
accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director and every such certificate shall be 
deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified. 
Id. 
 270. See CLARK CLIFFORD WITH RICHARD HOLBROOKE, COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT, 169–
70 (1991) (stating that the fifth function was intended to be a “catchall” for future contingencies, 
including covert actions).  Clark Clifford, one of the principal drafters of the National Security 
Act of 1947, testified that, “We did not mention [covert actions] by name because we felt it would 
be injurious to our national interest to advertise the fact that we might engage in such activities.”  
Id. at 170. 
 271. See Robert L. Borosage, Para-Legal Authority and Its Perils, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Summer 1976, at 166, 175–77 (“The language of the fifth function clause itself, as well as the 
entire public legislative record[,] may be taken at least as easily against, as for, the notion that 
Congress intended to authorize covert action in 1947.”).  Borosage noted further that “[t]he first 
director of the CIA, Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter[,] stated he had no interest in covert action, 
and intended the CIA to be purely an ‘intelligence outfit.’”  Id. at 177.  For more commentary that 
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charter and the legislative history were shrouded in some ambiguity.272  And 
the Executive offered few details in the requests for appropriations.273  
Whether or not statutory authority existed for covert action, Congress was not 
too involved in the second period, giving broad deference to the President’s 
prerogative on intelligence activities. 
During the third period, starting with the Hughes-Ryan Amendment,274 
covert action received explicit statutory support.  Yet, because of abuses that 
had been revealed in the covert-action process, the relationship between the 
two elected branches changed.  The third period was thus quite different from 
the first two.  No matter from which branch, those around the President 
became less willing to trust his intelligence decisions.  Congress got more 
involved. 
This Article, to put a modest frame to best use, presents legal references to 
the second and third periods of American covert action.  For those interested in 
the first period, that is, everything from the Declaration of Independence 
through World War II, the Constitution stands as a basic reference.  In the third 
period, the long-term trend on covert action is toward more participation from 
Congress and more transparency to the public. 
A. The National Security Act of 1947 
The National Security Act of 1947 established the CIA and the NSC within 
the Executive Office of the President.275  The formal members of the NSC 
include the President as chairman, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, 
and the Secretary of Defense.276  In practice, many other officials participate in 
NSC meetings, and the NSC has a large staff that serves the President through 
the National Security Advisor.277  From the beginning, the 1947 Act cast the 
CIA as an executive instrument that reported straight to the President or the 
NSC.278  Many people, as noted, interpreted the Act as authority for covert 
actions at the President’s discretion.279 
 
covert action was not raised during enactment of the 1947 Act, see RANELAGH, supra note 5, at 
104–11; THOMAS F. TROY, DONOVAN AND THE CIA: A HISTORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 377–410 (1981). 
 272. See PRADOS, supra note 5, at 20–21; WEINER, supra note 5, at 327–28. 
 273. See PRADOS, supra note 5, at 20–21; WEINER, supra note 5, at 327–28. 
 274. Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93–559, sec. 
32, § 662, 88 Stat. 1795, 1804 (1974) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1976)), repealed 
by Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–88, 103 Stat. 429. 
 275. 50 U.S.C. §§ 403-1, 403-3 (2000). 
 276. Id. § 402 (a). 
 277. Id. § 402 (c). 
 278. Pub. L. No. 80-253, § 102(a), 61 Stat. 495, 497; see also Cline, supra note 21, at 359 
(stating that the CIA, as “an executive instrument of the President . . . is implicitly empowered to 
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After the 1947 Act passed, not many legislators expressed an interest in or 
requested any briefings about covert action.280  Congress’s lack of interest was 
accentuated by a bipartisan consensus during the Cold War that covert action 
was largely a matter of presidential discretion.281  In view of the Soviet 
menace, covert actions during this period, whether in Italy or Iran, sought to 
prevent the spread of Communism.282  Congress, with faith in the Executive, 
assumed the CIA’s activities were conducted in a manner that maximized 
benefits and minimized risks.283 
This period of covert action became known as the age of “plausible 
deniability.”284  Often, the President’s approval of covert action was implied, 
not explicit.285  This lack of explicitness, especially on assassination, created 
political buffers between the President and those who conducted the covert 
action on his behalf.  If a particular covert action led to a flap, the officers took 
the blame instead of the President.  For example, President Kennedy is said to 
have remarked, after the Bay of Pigs debacle, that in other systems he would 
be resigning, not the Director of Central Intelligence.286  Further, given gaps in 
record keeping, Kennedy did not leave any fingerprints on assassination plots 
against Castro. 
 
carry out any missions that come within the authority of the chief executive of the United States” 
under the NSA of 1947). 
 279. REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 72, at 118. 
 280. LOCH K. JOHNSON, BOMBS, BUGS, DRUGS, AND THUGS:  INTELLIGENCE AND 
AMERICA’S QUEST FOR SECURITY 202 (2000) (quoting John Stennis, who, after being offered a 
CIA briefing on a covert action, responded “[n]o, no, my boy, don’t tell me.  Just go ahead and do 
it—but I don’t want to know!”); FRANK J. SMIST, CONGRESS OVERSEES THE UNITED STATES 
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 5 (2d ed. 1994) (quoting Clark Clifford, advisor to President 
Truman, who commented that “Congress chose not to be involved and preferred to be 
uninformed”).  Similarly, CIA general counsel Walter Pforzheimer stated that “[w]e allowed 
Congress to set the pace.  We briefed in whatever detail they wanted.  But one of the problems 
was you couldn’t get Congress to get interested.”  Id.; see also Gregory F. Treverton, 
Intelligence: Welcome to the American Government, in A QUESTION OF BALANCE: THE 
PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS, AND FOREIGN POLICY 74 (Thomas E. Mann ed., 1990). 
 281. DAUGHERTY, supra note 5, at 91–92. 
 282. Id. at 92. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id.  The doctrine of “plausible deniability” hinges on restricted congressional notice, or 
no notice at all, allowing the President, when necessary, to disclaim any knowledge of a covert 
action.  See M.E. Bowman, Secrets in Plain View: Covert Action the U.S. Way, in 72 
INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES: THE LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 1, 9 (Michael N. Schmitt 
ed., 1998) (citation omitted) (stating that the goal is to conduct activities in secret and avoid the 
disclosure of United States involvement). 
 285. See PRADOS, supra note 5, at 108–12, 193. 
 286. DALLEK, supra note 136, at 365–66 (“‘Under a parliamentary system of government it is 
I who would be leaving office,’ Kennedy told Dulles.  ‘But under our system it is you who must 
go.’”).   After a six-month secret review by the Agency’s Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick, 
Kennedy’s conviction that both Dulles and Bissell would have to resign was confirmed.  Id. 
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B. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment 
Congress increased its interest in oversight because several foreign policy 
and intelligence blunders eroded its trust in the Executive.  The mishandling of 
the Vietnam War, compounded by the CIA’s domestic spying,287 excesses in 
Chile,288 the Watergate scandal,289 and covert intervention in the Angolan Civil 
War,290 among other issues in the 1960s and 1970s, prompted Congress to take 
on a more active role on covert action.291 
In 1974, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 was passed.292  Hughes-Ryan was intended as the first of many measures 
to rein in the CIA.293  Hughes-Ryan prohibited funds from being expended on 
a CIA covert action unless the President: (1) found that the operation was 
“important to the national security of the United States” and (2) provided a 
finding “to the appropriate committees of the Congress.”294  The finding—
usually a written document signed by the President describing a contemplated 
 
 287. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY:  HISTORY, ORGANIZATION, AND ISSUES 622 (Tyrus G. 
Fain et al. eds., 1977) (stating that on January 15, 1975, DCI William Colby testified to the 
Senate Appropriations Committee that, from 1962 to 1972, under operation CHAOS, “officers of 
the CIA had spied on American journalists and political dissidents, placed informants within 
domestic protest groups, opened the mail of U.S. citizens, and assembled secret files on more 
than 10,000 American citizens”). 
 288. See COVERT ACTION IN CHILE, supra note 196, at 144–209 (1975); see also RANELAGH, 
supra note 5, at 513–20. 
 289. See COLBY, supra note 38, at 338; see also RANELAGH, supra note 5, at 520–30 
(explaining that although the Watergate investigations did not directly implicate the CIA, Howard 
Hunt, a former CIA employee, was one of the burglars, and the Nixon Administration did 
attempt, through a trumped up notion of national security, to use the CIA to take the FBI off the 
investigative trail). 
 290. See HENRY F. JACKSON, FROM THE CONGO TO SOWETO: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
TOWARD AFRICA SINCE 1960, at 65–74 (1982). 
 291. See Elizabeth Rindskopf, Intelligence Oversight in a Democracy, 11 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 
21, 23 (1988) (“In particular, the involvement of the CIA in various covert activities received 
considerable attention.  Congressional reaction was an attempt to assert control.”). 
 292. Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93–559, sec. 
32, § 662, 88 Stat. 1795, 1804 (1974) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1976)), repealed 
by Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–88, 103 Stat. 429. 
 293. See Rindskopf, supra note 291, at 23. 
 294. 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1976).  The Hughes-Ryan Amendment states in pertinent part: 
No funds appropriated under the authority of this or any other Act may be expended by or 
on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for operations in foreign countries, other 
than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the 
President finds that each such operation is important to the national security of the United 
States and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the 
appropriate committees of the Congress, including the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the United States Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States 
House of Representatives. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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action and listing all governmental agencies and third parties to be 
involved295—was apparently to be reported before implementation of the 
covert action.296  Nothing in Hughes-Ryan said, however, that findings had to 
be in writing. 
Congress, by receiving notice of covert actions, could try to block an 
action it deemed inappropriate by denying funds to carry out the action.297  
Through Hughes-Ryan, Congress heightened its power of the purse.  Those 
supporting presidential prerogative interpreted the Hughes-Ryan phrase, “in a 
timely fashion,” to allow the President to give notice after a covert action had 
started.298  The counter-argument from those siding with Congress was that for 
notice to be “timely” it had to be prior to the covert action.299  The sequence of 
notice and action, of course, was significant to the scope of oversight.  In a 
basic sense, Congress could not cut off funds for something that already 
happened. 
All in all, Hughes-Ryan added controls to covert action, but it did not 
provide total clarity in this process.  Of particular concern to the CIA was the 
breadth of activities that required a finding because Hughes-Ryan avoided the 
term “covert action.”  Rather, any “operations in foreign countries” that were 
not “intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence” were drawn into the 
statute’s provisions.300  By the plain language, even the CIA’s routine support 
to other American agencies required a finding.  If the statute had been drafted 
better, it would have provided a definition of “operations.”  So the ambiguity 
about what required a finding was left to executive-congressional dialogue and 
to a resolution, years later, in a different statute.301 
Hughes-Ryan ended plausible deniability, that is, the President’s ability to 
deny knowledge of a covert action.302  Further, Hughes-Ryan, by incorporating 
the phrase “to the appropriate committees of the Congress,” suggested that any 
congressional committee with jurisdiction over some aspect of intelligence 
activities could request a finding.303  Back then, before congressional oversight 
 
 295. See 50 U.S.C. § 413b(a) (2000) (defining a Presidential finding). 
 296. See 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1976). 
 297. DAUGHERTY, supra note 5, at 94–95 (noting that the reporting requirement gave 
members of Congress a meaningful opportunity to consult with the President about a covert 
action (or to cut off funds) before it was too late). 
 298. Id. 
 299. See id. at 97. 
 300. 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1976). 
 301. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-450, 94 Stat. 1975 
(1980) (current version as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 413 (2000)). 
 302. S. REP. NO. 94-465, at 58 (1975) (stating that “[t]he concept of plausible denial . . . is 
dead” and explaining that the clear purpose of Hughes-Ryan was to ensure accountability for 
covert operations). 
 303. See 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1976); see also BERKOWITZ & GOODMAN, supra note 264, at 26 
(stating that “[a]t its peak” the Hughes-Ryan Amendment required the reporting of significant 
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was consolidated into fewer committees, Hughes-Ryan called for the President 
to report a finding, arguably, to eight different congressional committees.304  
For the first time, “plausible deniability” gave way to “executive 
accountability.”305  And Congress took a big step into the arena, marking a new 
era in covert action. 
C. The Church Committee Report 
Soon after Congress proposed Hughes-Ryan, it created two legislative 
bodies to examine alleged wrongdoing by American intelligence agencies.  
Politics played its usual role as Democrats in Congress asserted themselves 
against a Republican President.  In 1975, the Senate created the Select 
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence 
Activities, known as the “Church Committee” after its chairman Senator Frank 
Church from Idaho.306  That same year, the House created the Select 
Committee on Intelligence, known as the “Pike Committee” after its chairman 
Congressman Otis Pike from New York.307  In the end the Church Committee 
was far more influential than the Pike Committee. 
Around the country, the mood was against covert action of any sort.  The 
Church Committee, in its final report in 1976, stated that it had given very 
serious thought to “proposing a total ban on all forms of covert action.”308  The 
pendulum did not swing that far, however.  Instead, the Committee concluded 
that covert action should be available for “grave, unforeseen threat[s] to United 
 
covert operations to several congressional committees comprising over 250 members and their 
senior staffs); William E. Conner, Reforming Oversight of Covert Actions After the Iran-Contra 
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House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on 
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 305. See id.  Senator Hughes and many of his colleagues viewed the Amendment as the 
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 308. S. REP. NO. 94-465, at 159 (1975). 
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States national security.”309  Even so, the Committee qualified its conclusion 
by explaining that covert actions: (1) must be construed as “an exceptional act” 
to be used only “when overt means will not suffice”; (2) must not be used as “a 
vehicle for clandestinely undertaking actions incompatible with American 
principles”; (3) must be established “on a careful and systematic analysis of a 
given situation” including the “consequence of an attempt to intervene”; and 
(4) must be initiated only after “the appropriate oversight committee[s] 
[are] . . . informed of all significant covert operations . . . .”310  Congress, in so 
many ways, strived to prevent a repeat of the Bay of Pigs and other failures 
from the era of plausible denial. 
As a result of the Church Committee’s findings and a weakened presidency 
after Watergate, the Executive Branch scaled back on covert action.311  Hence, 
the Ford Administration, atoning for other presidential sins or the perceptions 
of prior abuses, pursued very few covert actions.312  In all, the Church 
Committee, combined with Hughes-Ryan, paved the way for stronger 
congressional checks.313  As a result, the two prior models of covert action, one 
before the 1947 National Security Act and the other after, became relics of the 
past. 
D. The Intelligence Authorization Act of 1979 
Following the Church Committee and the Pike Committee, Congress 
enacted the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1979.314  This Act removed much 
of the intelligence community’s fiscal autonomy.315  In effect, off-the-books 
practices ceased and intelligence agencies were placed on the same annual 
authorization and appropriations terms as other executive agencies.316  By 
reinforcing its power of the purse,317 Congress, through annual authorization, 
got into the specifics of how the intelligence community spent its funds. 
Congress struggled toward supremacy over the President on intelligence 
activities.  If Congress disapproved of a covert action, it could cut off funding, 
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 310. See id. at 159–61. 
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which would halt current operations and prevent new ones from beginning.318  
Although aggressive, this assertion of congressional power was less under-
handed than the perennial ploy of leaking classified details about operations to 
the media. 
E. The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 
As the facts and findings of the Church Committee settled into public 
awareness, Congress started to tinker with the procedures on covert action.  
Sensing the new mood concerning covert action, President Ford—and then 
President Carter—put into effect many reforms through executive order.319  
Thus, executive self-regulating took some of the steam out of statutory 
reforms. 
By the end of the 1970s, the political climate had changed.  As noted, 
Islamic extremists had toppled the Shah of Iran, a staunch American ally.320  
The new Iranian regime, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, had taken American 
diplomats hostage.321  And the Soviet Union, taking advantage of America’s 
distraction, had invaded Afghanistan.322  These setbacks, along with others on 
the international scene, cried out for a reassertion of American power.  One 
aspect to that power was covert action, a return of Cold War ghosts to the 
scene. 
So Congress, rather than pass a comprehensive charter for the CIA, scaled 
back.  Congress limited itself to a few changes in Hughes-Ryan by way of the 
Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980.323  That Act consolidated the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) as the oversight committees for the 
intelligence community.324  By reducing the relevant committees from eight to 
two, Congress streamlined the notification process and increased the chances 
of maintaining secrecy on covert actions. 
The new Act codified reporting and oversight procedures, many of which 
the intelligence community had already adopted on its own.  In particular, 
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section (a) of the new Act required the DCI and “the heads of all departments, 
agencies, and other entities of the United States involved in intelligence 
activities”325 to keep the intelligence committees “fully and currently informed 
of all intelligence activities.”326  Of particular importance, the new Act spoke 
of “prior notice,” not specifying whether notification should be oral, written, or 
both.327  Unlike Hughes-Ryan, the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 covered 
more than the CIA. 
The new Act clarified that keeping the intelligence committees fully and 
currently informed of all intelligence activities did not entail “approval of the 
intelligence committees as a condition precedent” to undertaking the 
activity.328  Therefore, for some intelligence activities, after-the-fact notice 
seemed acceptable.  The new Act also required the DCI and the intelligence 
heads to furnish any information necessary for the committees to carry out 
their responsibilities and to report “any illegal intelligence activity or 
significant intelligence failure” in a “timely fashion.”329 
The new Act, creating as much confusion as it resolved, added section (b) 
to cover cases in which prior notice had not been given under section (a).  
Under section (b), the reasons for not providing prior notice needed to be 
disclosed.330  Most important, section (b) stated that the intelligence 
committees needed to be fully informed “in a timely fashion of intelligence 
operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for 
obtaining necessary intelligence.”331  As with Hughes-Ryan, the term 
“operations” was not defined, and Congress did not attempt to define anything 
called “covert action.”  Presumably, the CIA needed to notify Congress of a 
covert action under either section (a) or (b).332 
When prior notice was given, the new Act allowed the President to limit 
the number of people in Congress who received notice of a covert action.  
Under “extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United 
States,” the President could restrict notification to “the chairman and ranking 
minority members of the intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority 
leader of the House of Representatives, and the majority and minority leaders 
of the Senate.”333  Added up, this was limited notice to eight people, rather 
than to full committees. 
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The Reagan Administration, strutting executive stuff, argued later in its 
term that the new Act gave the President unfettered discretion to determine 
when to report a covert action to the intelligence committees.334  Some 
members of Congress, however, interpreted “timely fashion” to mean days, not 
weeks or months.335  Such differences between the President and Congress led 
to new calls for intelligence reform in the aftermath of Iran-Contra.336 
For the President, the preamble to the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 
did contain something that could be used to restrain Congress’s role on covert 
action.  The preamble stated that its requirements applied “[t]o the extent 
consistent with all applicable authorities and duties, including those conferred 
by the Constitution.”337  Therefore, a president who believed Congress had no 
constitutional role on covert action could interpret the rest of the statute as 
void.338  That bold interpretation, in the swing of a presidential baton, could 
silence those who demanded findings and other forms of notice.  Eventually, 
this baton was passed from President Reagan to President George W. Bush. 
F. Executive Orders 12,036 and 12,333 
Neither Hughes-Ryan nor the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 used the 
term “covert action” explicitly.  In those two pieces of legislation, Congress 
defined covert action as something other than gathering foreign intelligence.339  
Such definitions, by negative implication, were a throwback to the early days 
of covert action after World War II.  Unsurprisingly, as presidents added 
details to the covert-action process, they continued to use euphemisms.  For a 
while, their favorite euphemism for covert action was “special activities.”340 
In 1978, President Carter issued Executive Order 12,036 that provided a 
better definition of the role United States agencies played in intelligence 
activities.341  Section 1-302 of the Order continued the tradition of using the 
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National Security Council as the intermediary between the CIA and the 
President on covert action.342  Plus, it listed those members of a Special 
Coordination Committee (SCC) at the NSC who needed to be involved in the 
approval of special activities.343 
President Carter’s Order was repealed in 1981 when the Reagan 
Administration issued Executive Order 12,333.344  Of special importance, 
Executive Order 12,333 eliminated the list of executive officials who needed to 
be involved in approvals (and denials) of special activities.345  In a turn toward 
more obscurity on the published process for covert action, the Reagan 
Administration gave the NSC the basic power to “establish such committees as 
may be necessary to carry out its functions and responsibilities.”346  No longer 
was the Attorney General, for example, guaranteed a place at the table by the 
unclassified language of the Executive Order.  The NSC, on behalf of the 
President, could pick and choose those people it wanted to participate in the 
process of reviewing covert action.347  In this regard, Reagan’s Executive 
Order can be interpreted as a challenge to congressional oversight and other 
forms of public scrutiny regarding covert action.  In essence, President Reagan 
was the role model for President George W. Bush.  Breaking with the tradition 
of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, the Church Committee, and the Intelligence 
Oversight Act of 1980, the Reagan Administration softened the spotlight on 
covert action. 
An important aspect to Executive Order 12,333, a bit of light in the 
darkness, is its definition of covert action.348  This definition has carried 
forward, in large part, to the present day.349  Executive Order 12,333 describes 
covert action as: 
[Special activities] conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives 
abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States 
Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions in 
support of such activities, but which are not intended to influence United 
States political processes, public opinions, policies, or media and do not 
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include diplomatic activities or the collection or production of intelligence or 
related support functions.350 
This definition reflects three basic propositions about covert action.  First, 
it agrees that “[c]overt activity is not fundamentally an intelligence activity; 
rather, it is a foreign policy option” for the White House.351  That is, the Order 
excludes traditional intelligence activities—foreign intelligence and counter-
intelligence—which constitute the CIA’s primary mission.352  Second, 
emphasizing the need for secrecy to protect intelligence sources and methods, 
the Order establishes the CIA as the appropriate American agency to conduct 
covert action during peacetime.353  During a declared war or a period covered 
by the War Powers Resolution, the Armed Forces are acknowledged for their 
role in special activities.354  Otherwise, the CIA is in charge “unless the 
President determines that another agency” is better suited.355  Although this 
part of the Executive Order seems to call for deliberation in switching to 
another agency, nothing in the Order suggests that the President would have to 
do more than make an oral statement, during an unrelated meeting in the Oval 
Office or while chairing an NSC meeting, to make the switch.  The NSC and 
the CIA, after all, serve at his direction.  Third, the Order makes clear that the 
details of any special activity should be kept from the public.356  Indeed, if the 
President had used the term covert action, instead of special activity, the need 
for secrecy would have been even more obvious.  Covert action is the opposite 
of acknowledged activity. 
G. Iran-Contra 
In the wake of Iran-Contra,357 both the President and Congress created 
entities to study the scandal and recommended remedial measures to the 
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intelligence community.358  The public renewed its interest in the third option 
of American foreign policy.359  And not since the Church Committee was so 
much about the CIA and the NSC revealed. 
One study determined that although “[c]overt operations are a necessary 
component of our Nation’s foreign policy,” the “Administration’s conduct in 
the Iran-Contra Affair was inconsistent” with the Intelligence Oversight Act of 
1980.360  Very troubling to most observers was that the President kept the SSCI 
and the HPSCI in the dark for ten months about the Iranian arms sales and the 
supplies to the Contras.361  The Reagan Administration had justified its ten-
month delay in notification by a broad interpretation of the phrase “timely 
fashion” in the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980.362  These justifications 
were frustrating to Congress.  Sure, Congress could be more specific about 
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what it expected.  But how could oversight be conducted when the Executive 
blatantly ignored the law? 
H. The Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991 
The SSCI and the HPSCI, armed with recommendations from the Iran-
Contra committees, drafted new legislation for better oversight.363  Clearly, the 
new legislation was a remedy for past abuses, whether from Iran-Contra or 
earlier eras.  Indeed, at the beginning of a report on the new legislation, the 
Senate noted: 
Under current law . . . the Congressional mandate is ambiguous, confusing 
and incomplete.  There is no express recognition in statute of the President’s 
authority to conduct covert actions . . . [,] Presidential approval procedures are 
not specified . . . [,] [t]he statutory requirement for informing the intelligence 
committees of covert actions are subject to misinterpretation, and the scope of 
activities covered by the law is undefined.364 
Such efforts to set the comprehensive rules of the covert-action game 
resulted in the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991,365 the last piece of 
major legislation on the process for authorizing and conducting covert actions. 
This framework was in place on 9/11 and continues to the present day.  
Overall, Title VI of the 1991 Act repealed the Hughes-Ryan Amendment,366 
replaced Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947,367 provided a 
statutory definition of covert action for the first time,368 and established more 
comprehensive reporting requirements.369  In explicit terms, Congress 
recognized the President’s authority to conduct covert action.  Thus, covert 
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action became a normal part of the American legal landscape.  The remaining 
questions were on the details. 
The Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991, like the Hughes-Ryan 
Amendment, rested on a basic premise that the President, not some delegate, 
should be the one who authorizes covert action.  The President should do so 
upon a finding that the action is necessary to an “identifiable” objective of 
American foreign policy important to the national security.370  Reacting to 
Iran-Contra, the 1991 legislation enacted a number of new requirements: (1) a 
finding must be in writing;371 (2) the finding must be reported to Congress “as 
soon as possible” and “before the initiation of the covert action;”372 (3) if time 
does not permit the preparation of a written finding, a written record of the 
President’s decision must be made “contemporaneously” and reduced to a 
written finding within forty-eight hours;373 (4) other than in exceptional cases, 
the finding may not authorize activities that have already occurred;374 (5) the 
finding must specify each U.S. entity or third party which will fund or 
participate significantly in the action;375 and finally (6) no finding may 
authorize “any action that would violate the Constitution or any statute of the 
United States.”376 
Despite all the changes, the 1991 Act did not completely intrude on the 
President’s power.  It made clear that nothing in its title “shall be construed” as 
requiring approval from the intelligence committees “as a condition precedent 
to the initiation of any significant anticipated intelligence activity.”377  (Covert 
action, it seems, would be a significant anticipated intelligence activity, not 
requiring congressional approval.)  Further, Section 503(c) spelled out two 
exceptions to the rule that a written finding must be fully reported to 
Congress.378  First, in situations where the President determines that it is 
“essential to limit access to the finding to meet extraordinary circumstances 
affecting vital interests of the United States” disclosure may be limited to eight 
people—specifically the chairpersons and ranking minority members of the 
two intelligence committees and the majority and minority leaders of both the 
House and the Senate.379  Second, in situations where a covert action has begun 
without providing Congress with a finding, “the President shall fully inform 
 
 370. Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, sec. 602(a)(2), § 503(a). 
 371. Id. § 503(a)(1). 
 372. Id. § 503(c)(1). 
 373. Id. § 503(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 374. Id. § 503(a)(2). 
 375. Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, sec. 602(a)(2), § 503(a)(3). 
 376. Id. § 503(a)(5). 
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 378. See id. §§ 503(c)(2), 503(c)(3). 
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the intelligence committees in a timely fashion.”380  In those situations, the 
President must also “provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior 
notice.”381  This exception, drawing on past practices, might be used in 
extraordinary circumstances similar to President Carter’s decision not to 
inform Congress of Canadian assistance in freeing U.S. hostages from Iran.382 
In sum, President George H.W. Bush’s lobbying and veto of an earlier bill 
prevented Congress from imposing an across-the-board requirement of notice 
to the oversight committees within forty-eight hours of a finding.  As a form of 
conciliation, President Bush stated in his November 30, 1989 signing statement 
for the 1991 Act: 
The statute requires prior notice or, when no prior notice is given, timely 
notice.  I anticipate that in almost all instances, prior notice will be possible.  In 
those rare instances where prior notice is not provided, I anticipate that notice 
will be provided within a few days.  Any withholding beyond this period 
would be based upon my assertion of the authorities granted this office by the 
Constitution.383 
Thus, President Bush’s tenor was sufficient to atone for Iran-Contra sins, 
perceived or real, which occurred when Reagan was President (and Bush was 
Vice President). 
Under the 1991 Act, not only must covert actions be reported to Congress, 
but so must “any significant undertaking pursuant to a previously approved 
finding.”384  The changes are made in a Memorandum of Notification (MON), 
which is technically different from an original finding.385  Of course, the line 
between a change and new action is not always clear.  Yet, either as an MON 
or a finding, something must be provided to Congress. 
President Bush, as he noted when signing the new legislation, did not 
believe a statutory definition of “covert action” was necessary.386  Congress 
disagreed.  To a great extent, the 1991 Act borrowed from President Reagan’s 
Executive Order 12,333.387  Thus, the new Act defined covert action as: 
[A]n activity or activities of the United States Government to influence 
political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the 
 
 380. Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, sec. 602(a)(2), § 503(c)(3). 
 381. Id. 
 382. See supra Part I.F. 
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role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged 
publicly, but does not include— 
(1) activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, 
traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or 
maintain the operational security of United States Government programs, 
or administrative activities; 
(2) traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such 
activities; 
(3) traditional law enforcement activities conducted by United States 
Government law enforcement agencies or routine support to such 
activities; or 
(4) activities to provide routine support to the overt activities (other than 
activities described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3)) of other United States 
Government agencies abroad. 388 
This definition turns on the government’s ability to maintain plausible 
deniability of the activity to the outside world: “[t]his deniability would not, of 
course, apply to those within the United States Government who have a need 
to know about such activities . . . .”389  In other words, the buffers and filters to 
covert action exist between the President and the domestic and international 
public, not between the President and the implementers in the Executive 
Branch.  The attribute of “deniability,” however, does not mean that the 
activities that underlie a covert action will be invisible to the public.390  Rather, 
“covert actions may involve activities which are visible or public, but the role 
of the United States in carrying out such activities is itself not apparent or 
acknowledged.”391  Under the new statute, the relevant inquiry is whether the 
United States government intends for its participation in an action to remain 
undisclosed.392  Note the Predator strike in Yemen in 2002.393  By contrast, as 
the Senate Report explained, “[a]ctivities which may be undertaken in secret 
but where the role of the United States will be disclosed or acknowledged once 
such activities take place are not covert actions.”394  This excludes actions 
whose planning and preparation are secret but whose secrecy disappears as 
soon as American boots, complemented by American uniforms, hit the 
ground.395 
 
 388. Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, sec. 602(a)(2), § 503(e). 
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As a sort of negative definition of covert action, the new statute rules out 
some activities.396  For example, “[c]oncealment or misrepresentation of the 
true nature of an acknowledged United States activity does not make it a 
‘covert action,’ even if the concealment or misrepresentation is intended to 
influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad.”397  In short, 
something is not a covert action just because its specific objectives are 
concealed.398  The essence of covert action lies in hiding the American hand 
behind an operation, not simply covering up some of the fingers.  As the 
Senate summarized, “the definition encompasses activities to influence 
conditions—be they political, economic, or military—overseas and focuses on 
the objective features of the activity, rather than on a formal relationship to 
foreign policy purposes, as the controlling test in determining which activities 
constitute covert action.”399 
The new statute, borrowing from Executive Order 12,333, also carved out 
various activities from the general definition by category.400  Foreign 
intelligence, counter-intelligence, counter-espionage, traditional diplomatic 
and military activities, traditional law enforcement activities, and routine 
support for all such activities are not covert actions.401  Therefore, another way 
of defining covert action is by contradistinction to other activities.  These 
activities, however, do not lend themselves to precise definition.  Defining 
what is “routine” may be just as difficult as defining what is “covert.” 
The continuity between Executive Order 12,333 and the statutory 
definition created some confusion.402  In reconciling the two definitions of 
covert action, the new Act’s drafters intended that “the core [statutory] 
definition of covert action . . . be interpreted broadly.”403  More precisely, the 
definition from the 1991 Act has greater application than the term “special 
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activities” from the Executive Order.404  For this reason, the new statute 
applies not only to classic covert actions (i.e. propaganda, paramilitary action, 
and political action), but also to some activities that do not fit the traditional 
rubric of foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence.405  In response to Iran-
Contra, Congress drew more activities within the framework of written 
findings and prior notice to the intelligence committees.406  For example, even 
if the “exfiltration” of a blown intelligence asset from a foreign country was 
not a classic covert action, Congress expected the covert action rules to apply.  
Indeed, the CIA might actually use personnel and resources from the covert 
action part of its house on such a special activity. 
On covert action, the President and Congress must get things right.  The 
statutory definitions are very important.  How well the President and Congress 
do on covert action will have huge ripples, affecting other areas of foreign 
policy and domestic policy.  From George Washington to George W. Bush to 
our new President, so much depends on the trust between the President and 
Congress. 
For any President, another way to define covert action is by the potential 
damage of a failed operation.  In general, a failed covert action has more 
profound repercussions than a failed foreign intelligence operation.  The fall-
out to the botched Bay of Pigs operation could have been war with Cuba; the 
looming threat of Iran-Contra was impeachment.  By contrast, a mistake in 
gathering foreign intelligence might result in  the imprisonment or death of a 
human asset, most significant to that person and her family, but not so 
significant to the United States.  Because of such differences in potential 
damage, it makes sense that covert action requires specific presidential 
authorization and congressional oversight.407  When the stakes are higher, there 
should be more process, and the decisions should be made at senior levels.  For 
covert action, more checks are needed on executive power.408  Covert action, 
no matter what, is different in kind from the Federal Communications 
Commission distributing frequencies to American radio stations. 
Those activities that escape the covert action label, either through error or 
by design, are subject only to routine decisionmaking; they do not require 
“special authorization” or a written finding.409  On such activities, as with so 
much else that falls within executive discretion, the President may choose to 
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keep Congress in the dark and to rely on underlings to take care of details.410  
This kind of discretion takes the matter from national security law to 
administrative law. 
Not everything that falls outside the category of covert action, however, 
evades congressional oversight.  Congress, perhaps aware of the imprecision to 
any definition of covert action, created an additional layer of oversight through 
section 602 of the 1991 Act, which amended Title V of the National Security 
Act of 1947.411  In pertinent part, the added section 502 provides: 
To the extent consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized 
disclosure of classified information . . . , the Director of Central Intelligence 
and the heads of all departments, agencies, and other entities of the United 
States Government involved in intelligence activities shall (1) keep the 
intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence 
activities, other than a covert action . . . , including any significant anticipated 
intelligence activity and any significant intelligence failure . . . .412 
According to the drafters, “[t]he requirement to report significant 
anticipated activities means, in practice, that the committees should be advised 
of important new program initiatives and specific activities that have major 
foreign policy implications.”413  By adding “significant anticipated intelligence 
activity,” Congress expanded the areas in which the Executive needed to 
provide information.414  Even if the requirement of a written finding did not 
apply, Congress made it clear that the President and the spymasters were 
expected to communicate with the oversight committees.415  By this 
arrangement, the clear preference was light over darkness, information over 
stone-walling. 
Under the new statutory framework, the CIA does not have many excuses 
for keeping the intelligence committees in the dark.  The CIA might believe an 
activity is “insignificant” and not a “covert action.”  But that excuse might go 
contrary to keeping the committees informed “of all intelligence activities.” 
However the new Act is parsed, most would agree that the CIA does not 
have to tell the intelligence committees everything.  The CIA should not be 
expected to spend more time reporting on activities than conducting them; an 
appropriate balance is still necessary.  For example, consistent with the 1991 
Act, the CIA might tell the committees that a senior Russian intelligence 
officer has defected to the United States—without giving his name.  By way of 
compartments for operational security, very few within the CIA itself need to 
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know the defector’s full identity; even CIA analysts with top-secret clearances 
might not be told.  Similarly, a generic notice, stripped of the most sensitive 
information, might be a fair compromise between “fully” informing the 
committees and protecting the defector’s life. 
So on balance, the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991 expanded the 
connections between the President and Congress on intelligence activities, a 
shared arrangement laid out in the original National Security Act of 1947 and 
the amendments that followed.416  As the Cold War came to an end, Congress 
reasserted its will that a second branch represent the public in reviewing covert 
actions.  Rather than have things done by winks, nods, and other oral 
understandings, the President’s signature was required for covert action.  
Backdating was for the past; full notice was for the future.  One now wonders 
whether the revelation of new abuses from President Bush’s term will cause 
another round of changes to the covert action framework—or whether things 
will remain the same. 
III.  DELEGATION 
President George W. Bush said 9/11 changed everything for the United 
States,417 which later became his reason to tune out the past and to reduce 
Congress’s role in keeping us safe.  Even so, a comprehensive, one-size-fits-
all, covert-action program within a so-called global struggle on terror defeats 
the purpose of having the President deliberate on each significant foreign 
policy decision.  Not everyone in our democracy trusts the CIA to fill in all the 
blanks for the President. 
Our desire to keep the President in contact with the dark side is a recent 
phenomenon.  Until the 1970s, before Congress charged into the realm of 
covert action, the CIA often took care of “routine” covert actions, without 
seeking the President’s prior approval, and without informing the President 
after the action was taken.418  On those actions that the CIA took to the White 
House, sometimes the President suggested his approval more by winks and 
nods.419  Often, to maintain plausible denial, the President did not put anything 
in writing.420  For example, the CIA clearly believed it had the authority to 
assassinate Fidel Castro, although it seems neither President Kennedy nor his 
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brother put anything in writing for the CIA taskmasters.421  Years later, 
Hughes-Ryan and other acts of Congress put an end to such a loose chain of 
command.422  Plausible denial ended.423 
Although the President is now required to approve covert actions in 
writing, Congress, it still seems, accepts that those findings may be short and 
general.  The change from the era of plausible denial may be as much about 
form as substance.  Congress has not required (and probably could not) a 
certain number of pages for something to satisfy a written requirement.  As a 
result, those outside the inner sanctum are left to speculate on the forms—and 
the number of pages—to covert action.424  Very few people are involved in the 
process of conceiving and approving covert action.425  Those without security 
clearances are excluded, and many with top-secret clearances do not have a 
need to know.426  By design and by necessity, the texts to presidential findings 
are not shared with the public.427  The secrecy, however, has not been 
complete.428  Some clues have leaked to the public through articles and books, 
and these clues are sufficient for some scholarship into the dark side of 
American foreign policy.429 
Soon after 9/11, the DCI, George Tenet, went to President Bush and his 
advisers with a wish list of aggressive measures against the Taliban and al 
Qaeda.430  These measures fit into what the President declared as a new form 
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of war to “smoke [the terrorists] out of their caves.”431  Tenet asked.  Tenet 
received.  Very few restraints were placed on him or the CIA.  Vice President 
Cheney, talking about the things that needed to be done in the shadows against 
terrorists, said as much during a television interview within a week of 9/11.432 
The White House authorization that Tenet received probably hinged on a 
list of “high-value” terrorism targets.  These targets, subject to the most 
extreme measures in a “lethal” finding, may have been designated by name or 
by a collection of factors.  However the finding was worded, Osama bin 
Laden, still at large, must have been at the top of the list.  As time went on, 
assuming that the finding depended more on names than on factors, the list 
may have been revised to delete those who were captured or killed, and to add 
those identified as new threats.  This process of revision took place more at the 
Agency level than the White House level—although President Bush is reported 
to have kept a sort of al Qaeda scorecard at his desk.433  For the sake of speed 
and to keep the President’s hands relatively clean, Tenet may have retained 
broad authority to decide whether and when to hit those on the list.434  
Accordingly, Tenet, not the President, was the man pulling the trigger on some 
terrorists. 
As deep as the country traveled into night, President George W. Bush was 
not the first to issue a blanket finding against terrorists.435  The practice of one-
size-fits-all findings against terrorists has antecedents in the covert actions of 
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the Ford and Carter Administrations.436  Those findings serve as reminders that 
other presidents have been concerned about terrorist attacks.  For us, focused 
on the present, the stakes could not be higher.  Images of a smoldering pit at 
Ground Zero, a severed chunk from the Pentagon, and a crumpled plane in a 
Pennsylvania field are part of the collective consciousness. 
Compared to President George W. Bush, Presidents Ford and Carter did 
not make covert action a central part of their foreign policies.437  Under the 
Ford Administration and the early part of the Carter Administration, covert 
action almost came to a close.438  The scandals under the Nixon Administration 
caused an extreme caution about intelligence activities.439  President Carter’s 
DCI, Stansfield Turner, described the moment well: “When I took over in 1977 
the covert action cupboard was bare and sentiment within the CIA itself was 
against stocking it.”440  Later in the Carter Administration, after the fall of the 
Shah in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, covert action picked up 
pace.441  President Carter, putting aside some of his idealism about a foreign 
policy based on human rights, issued several findings to counter the 
Communist threat.442  The findings themselves, although in writing, were short 
and broad.443  Eventually, responding to congressional complaints about this 
generality, President Carter added some detail.444  By the end of the Carter 
Administration, the findings fit within two categories: either generic findings 
on “transnational issues,” or tailored findings for a “single country/single 
issue.”445  Under either category, the findings were more like an investment 
banker’s deal sheet than a corporate issuer’s indenture.  It seems that both 
President and Congress trusted the CIA to fill in details. 
Broad findings have advantages and disadvantages.  One advantage is that 
they give the specialists, usually at the CIA, the discretion to interpret the 
President’s wishes.  The President just does not have the time or the expertise 
to spell out everything for the covert action crew.  A disadvantage is that the 
CIA may end up implementing its own wishes rather than the President’s.  
Recreated is the potential for sloppiness and abuse from the old days of 
plausible denial. 
 
 436. Id. 
 437. See DAUGHERTY, supra note 5, at 178. 
 438. Id. 
 439. See STANSFIELD TURNER, SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY: THE CIA IN TRANSITION 84 
(1985). 
 440. Id. 
 441. See DAUGHERTY, supra note 5, at 183–84. 
 442. See id. at 185. 
 443. Id. 
 444. See id. at 184–85. 
 445. Id. at 185. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
542 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:485 
Problems with delegations of power are not unique to covert action or to 
the CIA.  Even so, the fall-out from a covert action gone bad (lost lives and the 
potential for escalation into open war) is higher than that from the Federal 
Communications Commission issuing a radio license to a party less deserving 
than another.  Moreover, the FCC’s actions are subject to public checks such as 
notice and comment rulemaking, not applicable to the CIA. 
Stansfield Turner observed an inherent tension between the CIA and 
Congress on covert action: the CIA, as implementer, has a tendency to prefer 
broad findings whereas Congress, as overseer, tends toward the specific.  As 
Turner notes: 
Under a broad finding, an operation can be expanded considerably; with a 
narrow one, the CIA has to go back to the President to obtain a revised finding 
if there is any change of scope.  The Congress is wary of broad findings; they 
can easily be abused.  The CIA is afraid of narrow findings; they can be a 
nuisance.446 
That tension may prevail today for Predator strikes and other measures 
against terrorists.  The preferences between the CIA and Congress may have 
remained the same.  For Turner’s observations to be accurate, however, one 
must assume that the CIA is willing to take risks in the gray area not covered 
by explicit instructions.  That may no longer be true. 
As a result of the new formalism to covert action, the lessons learned from 
Cuba, Chile, Iran-Contra, and other experiences, the CIA may be pushing for 
findings more akin to SEC registration statements to protect its officers against 
civil and criminal liability.  Congress, on the other hand, may have shifted 
toward the general.  Through notification, Congress takes on an implicit role of 
approving presidential proposals for covert action.447  Congress, of course, 
does not have the explicit authority to approve the actions, an approval which 
remains a core presidential prerogative, but the collective decision by the 
oversight committees not to leak a particular plan and not to cut off funding 
brings Congress into the circle of responsibility.  For this reason, members of 
the oversight committees who are averse to risk might prefer broad findings, 
paralleling Congress’s blissful ignorance during the era of plausible denial.  If 
something goes wrong with a broad finding, Congress can disclaim 
responsibility and blame those who filled in the blanks.  That said, Turner’s 
general description is not necessarily incorrect.  So much depends on context.  
So much depends on first principles. 
Under the Constitution, the President may not delegate certain powers.  
The power to veto bills448 and the power to pardon criminal offenses449 come 
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to mind.  Although the President could seek advice on what to veto and whom 
to pardon, the ultimate decision should come from the Oval Office.  Delegating 
those powers would go against the checks and balances of our system.  If the 
President entrusted the veto power or the pardon power to the Vice President, 
that could be construed as a sign that the President is no longer capable of 
carrying out his duties.  On the other hand, the President should not be 
expected to carry out all Article II powers by himself.  Although he personifies 
the executive power, he is not the only person in the Executive Branch.  The 
Constitution provides for consultation with other people in the Executive 
Branch to run the national government.450 
When it comes to covert action, the commander-in-chief power differs 
from the veto and pardon powers.  The veto and pardon are more binary: either 
a bill is vetoed or not; either someone is pardoned or not.  The commander-in-
chief power has a broader range.  The President could be called to make 
strategic decisions such as reacting to attacks from other nations or launching 
anticipatory defenses against other nations.  Depending on his preferences, he 
could leave the tactical decisions to the generals or, like President Lyndon 
Johnson during the Vietnam War, could involve himself in selecting the sites 
to be bombed.451  No matter the management style, there still seems to be a 
core to the commander-in-chief power that only the President should exercise.  
For example, President Bush may not have been allowed to delegate the 
decision to invade Iraq in 2003 to Vice President Cheney.  In a further 
extrapolation, if President Bush had delegated this decision to his wife Laura, 
other problems would arise.  The First Lady was neither elected, as Cheney 
was, nor confirmed by the Senate, as were other executive officers.452 
At the statutory level, the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991 also goes 
against oblique delegations.  Under that Act, the President must issue a written 
finding that demonstrates the importance of each covert action to American 
national security.453  In practice, the finding is shared with the oversight 
committees, but not with the full Congress.  In the spirit of the Act, a one-time, 
one-sentence finding that “the national security requires comprehensive covert 
action against al Qaeda” does not suffice.  The President would not be playing 
by the rules.  Neither President Ford nor President Carter was that broad in any 
finding. 
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American presidents retain great discretion in determining how to cut and 
serve the covert action bread.  One President might present something in one 
slice that another President might present in two slices.  Such discretion, within 
reason, is entirely permissible within the scope of a statute that does not 
legislate to the detail of the Internal Revenue Code.  But a piece can be too 
thin, contrary to Congress’s express purpose—from Hughes-Ryan to the 
Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991—to perform oversight.  Information, 
we all know, nourishes oversight.  The thinnest finding would be a return to 
the proposition that Congress cannot play any role in covert action.  Even if the 
oversight committees do not object to a thin slice on covert action, the problem 
remains for the rest of our government.  It is not for two intelligence 
committees to overrule what two houses of Congress and the President agreed 
to in the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991.  The legislative veto is 
dead.454  Congress deserves more than wafers on the table. 
Vague or blank findings present the dangers of what preceded Hughes-
Ryan.  If Congress has manifested any intent about covert action it is that 
presidential findings and the instructions to the operators must contain some 
detail.455  The foreign country’s importance must be explained.456  The type or 
types of covert action must be designated.457  And the connections to other 
aspects of American policy toward that country must be made.  These things 
could fit on a page, but not in a line. 
Times have changed, and covert action has become another area for 
compromise between Congress and the President on American foreign policy.  
Yet, by using statutes to set the boundaries on covert action, one buries a 
deeper debate about inherent powers.  The ambiguities are thus sorted out 
through statutory interpretation rather than constitutional dialogue.458  Some 
actions are clearly in bounds, some clearly out of bounds.  Between the two 
clear markers, in a twilight zone, there is so much room for disagreement—and 
for the reasoned application of facts to standards. 
IV.  LIMITED NOTICES 
President George W. Bush, failing to heed the lessons of Watergate and 
Iran-Contra, may have returned to “off-the-books” covert action in the struggle 
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against terrorism.  This may have been as simple as notifying fewer members 
of Congress than the statutory minimum.  Or this may have been as brazen as 
disregarding all statutory requirements, keeping Congress in the dark through a 
very expansive view of commander-in-chief powers. 
The statutory framework allows limited notice to Congress if “the 
President determines that it is essential . . . to meet extraordinary circumstances 
affecting the vital interests of the United States.”459  Thus, limited notice 
depends on the President’s initiative.460  If the process of covert action is seen 
as a game of tennis, the Executive serves first.  The term “extraordinary,” 
however, suggests that limited notice is an exception, not a rule.461 
That the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991 allows for limited notice to 
Congress in some circumstances is a concession to the Executive Branch that 
the odds of a leak or an inadvertent disclosure are reduced when fewer people 
know about the secret activity.462  While Congress is involved in covert action, 
it watches over the process but does not approve or disapprove of a covert 
action.463  The Executive decides whether to conduct covert action—and the 
details to any covert action.464 
Members of Congress and their staffs, when notified about covert action, 
can meet with the President and his staff to argue against a covert action.  Less 
fair, Congress can use selective leaks.  Even the threat of a leak, implied or 
express, can cause the Executive to modify or abandon a covert action.  Those 
who leak, of course, are betting that the Executive, out of respect for another 
branch of government or for fear of a public backlash, will not investigate the 
leak, complete with subpoenas and polygraphs. 
Not only do leaks compromise covert action, they complicate the CIA’s 
collection of intelligence.  The CIA’s sources include persons who commit 
espionage on our behalf and foreign intelligence services that share 
information with us through liaison channels.465  The CIA, like any other 
intelligence service, cannot function unless it shows that it can be trusted to 
keep the secrets.  It is faint consolation to the blown source or to the exposed 
liaison service that the source of the leak was Congress, not the CIA.  When 
those sources or liaison services make deals, they expect the CIA to enforce 
those deals across our government.  If those deals are not enforced, the CIA’s 
sources, necessary for both covert action and foreign intelligence, clam up. 
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The intelligence community believes the potential for leaks rises in 
geometric proportion to the number of people “read into a program.”  Adding 
three people to the list of a covert action, for example, increases the odds of 
leaks and unauthorized disclosures on the order of eight.  This belief leads to 
“compartmenting,” by which classified information is only shared with those 
who have a “need to know.”466  This belief also leads to limited notice to 
Congress in exceptional cases.  In those cases, the risks of a leak outweigh the 
benefits—more process, more participation—of full notification to the 
oversight committees.  Here, the Executive holds the key to limited notice.467  
In deciding whether to use that key, the Executive weighs the interests: the 
importance of the covert action and the potential damage from leaks and 
disclosure.  The Executive, whether consciously or not, tends to overvalue the 
importance of the covert action to national security as well as the damage from 
an unauthorized disclosure and the likelihood that Congress will leak.  On the 
other hand, the Executive tends to undervalue the benefits of broader 
participation from Congress.  Those are facts of our system of divided 
government. 
Congress is not just a source of leaks, however.  One benefit to involving 
Congress is a reality check on what the American people will support if—and 
usually when—a covert action becomes known to the public.  Despite the 
CIA’s best efforts, history shows that very few covert actions, whether in Italy, 
Iran, Guatemala, Cuba, Chile, or Afghanistan, stay forever in the shadows.  
Politicians serve constituents while executive-branch bureaucrats serve their 
agency and the President.  Members of Congress, unlike a sole president, are a 
better approximation for the mood all over the country.  Perhaps the disaster at 
the Bay of Pigs, for example, could have been averted if President Kennedy 
had consulted members of Congress—beyond Senator William Fulbright—
who were not part of the executive groupthink.  If so, many lives would have 
been saved. 
An acute burden of limited notice, besides reducing the number of views 
among members of Congress, is that even those who do receive notice (the so-
called “Gang of Eight”) are often not allowed to consult their staffs, the 
national security experts and lawyers, to assist them in dealing with 
intelligence community officials who give the briefings.468  The gaps in 
knowledge between the Executive and Congress are thus accentuated.469 
On limited notice, it is difficult to prevent exceptions from becoming the 
rule.  Congress has only provided a short and general standard about notices.  
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So much depends on the good faith and the common understanding of those 
interpreting the rules and participating in the process—the White House, the 
CIA, and Congress.  To continue the tennis analogy, the President and 
Congress are players who are calling their own lines; for covert action, the 
courts do not serve as outside umpires.  If Congress concludes that the 
President has abused the process by limiting notice in routine cases, the 
remedy will come, most likely, from inter-branch negotiation and, less likely, 
by new legislation.470 
The statutory framework, after all, does not put a cap on how many times 
the exception to full notice can be invoked, nor does it spell out how to 
distinguish the exceptional covert action from the routine.471  As in so many 
other areas of the law, the fairness and the appropriateness of the result are in 
the eyes of the beholder.  The same thing may appear ordinary to one person 
and extraordinary to another; the perspectives on the object are different.  In 
any event, if words are to have any fixed meaning, something will have to be 
ordinary for other things to be extraordinary. 
Paramount is an understanding that limited notice is an exception within 
another exception.  The statutory framework already accepts that ordinary 
covert action, by definition, should not be briefed to the full Congress and 
should not be discussed in open hearings.472  The question is not whether to 
have secrecy.  The question is how much is appropriate and safe for a 
democracy.  A question of this sort does not lend itself to easy answers.  
Applied to Predator strikes in Yemen, it is clear that some sort of presidential 
finding was necessary because, consistent with plausible deniability, the 
Executive Branch still does not admit its role.  Much less clear is whether 
notice of the impending Predator strike could have been delayed or limited in 
Congress.473 
V.  TRANSPARENCY 
The process for approving covert action and for notifying the 
congressional committees should become more transparent to the public.  This 
can be done through an Executive Order or by statute.  While secrecy is 
necessary for effective covert action, the internal decision-making process, as a 
relic from the Cold War days, is still too opaque to the public.  For greater 
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accountability and increased public support, the President should spell out 
more of the decision-making process. 
The President could supplement the current Executive Order on 
intelligence activities.  More of the internal process at the CIA, particularly the 
interaction between the CIA and the NSC, should be declassified.  The 
advantage of the President doing this on his own initiative is that some 
constitutional questions concerning how far Congress can go in this core area 
of national security and foreign policy are avoided. 
From American history, the public knows that sometimes the White House 
may initiate a covert action.  At other times, the CIA, either through contacts in 
the White House or the NSC, may initiate the program.474  And, at other times, 
another agency such as the State Department or the Defense Department may 
put forward the covert action.475  In providing more transparency about the 
process, the President should clarify the usual mode for initiation, namely 
whether it is “top down” from the White House or “bottom up” from the CIA.  
This usual mode can be shared with the public without tying the President’s 
hands and without any damage to national security.  By taking away some of 
the unnecessary mystery to the process on Predator strikes and other covert 
actions, the new Executive Order will increase public support for this third 
option between diplomacy and combat. 
No matter what, a crafty and perseverant member of the public can gather 
clues about the American procedures for approving covert action.  Some of 
those clues come from articles by newspaper reporters on the CIA beat and 
from pieces by retired CIA officers.  William Daugherty’s book is especially 
useful.  Daugherty, a liaison officer between the CIA and the NSC, describes 
the various committees, all with lawyers involved, which worked up proposals 
for covert action during his tenure at the CIA.476  There is a Covert Action 
Planning Group (CAPG), chaired by the head or the deputy head of the 
Directorate of Operations.477  If the CAPG approves, the proposal goes to the 
Covert Action Review Group (CARG), chaired by the CIA’s executive 
director.478  If the CARG approves the proposal, it goes to the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency or the Deputy Director.479  If the DCIA or the 
DDCIA approves, the proposal goes to the Interagency Working Group for 
Covert Action (IWG).480 
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Thus, in the typical case, the proposal goes through internal committees at 
the CIA and an interagency group before it is presented to the NSC.  At the 
NSC, the proposal typically passes through two tiers before reaching the 
President for his signature.481  First, the deputies committee at NSC will 
discuss and revise the proposal.482  Next, the principals committee, which 
includes the relevant cabinet secretaries, will decide whether to recommend the 
covert action to the President.483 
For the most part, President George W. Bush continued to use the covert 
action procedures, changing the name of the IWG and perhaps giving the Vice 
President a larger role than usual.484  The new President, more explicitly than 
the prior one, should confirm that internal committees at the CIA are still 
involved in approving covert action and that the NSC still considers proposals 
in two tiers.  Further, the President should specify what sorts of covert actions, 
if any, must have the DCIA’s approval, rather than his deputy’s, in the CIA’s 
internal process.  Finally, the President should specify in what circumstances, 
if any, the internal committees or the NSC meetings may be bypassed to allow 
the DCIA, or someone else, to go straight to the President for approval. 
A special area of interest is the potential role of the Attorney General in 
reviewing and approving covert action.  Is he a member of any formal internal 
groups?  Or just an observer?  Many commentators probably believe that the 
more active the Attorney General is, the less likely it is that illegal actions will 
take place.  That is not always true, though.  Bobby Kennedy, as noted, was 
not always the voice of reason from the Justice Department on covert actions 
against Fidel Castro.485  But too much should not be made of Bobby Kennedy.  
The Attorney General, more independent from the intelligence community 
than lawyers at the CIA and the NSC, is well-suited within the Executive 
Branch to ensure that the covert-action process has complied with internal 
guidelines, statutes, and the Constitution.  By a new executive order or statute, 
the Attorney General should play a role in passing on the legality of covert 
action. 
Another area of interest is the potential role of the Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI).  The DNI was created in 2004 as an “intelligence czar” of 
sorts.486  Since then, the DNI has replaced the DCIA as the person who gives 
the President his daily intelligence briefing.487  After the intelligence 
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reorganization, the DNI “shall perform such other functions as the President 
may direct.”488  His subordinate, however, still reports to the President and the 
National Security Council; in other words, the DCIA shall “perform such other 
functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the 
President or the Director of National Intelligence may direct.”489  As a result, 
both the DNI and the DCIA are connected to “such other functions,” the 
traditional codeword for covert action. 
What remains unclear in practice is whether the DNI or the DCIA is the 
person most involved in recommending covert actions to the President.  
Further, no matter who makes the recommendations, it is unclear who manages 
the CIA’s operators in carrying out covert actions: the DNI or the DCIA.  So 
many arrangements are possible.  On such important questions, the new 
President owes the country a bit more clarity.  The DNI, after all, may have 
only added a layer of bureaucracy to the intelligence community.  At best, the 
DNI has taken the lead in coordinating analysis and collection.  The DNI, by a 
new executive order or statute, does not need a comprehensive role on covert 
action.  Going forward, the DCIA can continue the traditional role of briefing 
covert-action plans to the NSC and the President, and the covert-action 
machinery does not need to be moved from CIA to the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence.  In short, although the DNI should participate in the 
covert-action process by giving the President his counsel, the DNI should not 
manage the process or the operations. 
If the President refuses to provide more transparency about the covert-
action process, Congress should fill in more of the blanks by legislation that 
either receives his signature or overrides his veto.  The public does not need to 
know the names of the people or countries involved in a covert action because 
that would take most, if not all, of the “covert” out of the action.  The public, 
however, does deserve to know more about the process by which its 
government determines what to do with the third option. 
Whether Congress has the constitutional power to require more specificity 
from the President about the internal process for deciding on covert action is a 
very difficult question.  Unlike the current legal framework, which provides for 
classified briefings to the intelligence committees, my proposal would require 
the President to inform not only select members of Congress but the rest of the 
public.  My proposal, as a variant on the Freedom of Information Act,490 would 
open up more of the government’s activities to public scrutiny.  Although my 
proposal is simple, calling for specifics along the lines of National Security 
Decision Directives which have trickled out to the public, its constitutionality 
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is complex.  Does Congress have an enumerated power, amplified by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, to enact such a statute?  Or would such a statute 
violate the Constitution by trespassing on executive territory? 
These questions replay the debate about whether Congress can require 
advanced notice of covert action, a debate that was on display in the majority 
and minority reports from the Iran-Contra investigations.491  Those who defend 
Congress tie the need for information and notifications to the power of the 
purse.492  For Congress to decide whether to fund or to continue to fund a 
covert action, so the argument goes, Congress must know what the CIA is 
doing with its appropriations.  The argument continues that for voters to decide 
on whether they approve of the Executive’s foreign policy, they must have 
some sense, either directly or indirectly through their representatives, of what 
is being done on the dark side.  Thus, my transparency statute could be linked 
to Congress’s established role in conducting oversight on intelligence 
activities. 
On the other hand, those who defend executive power stress the need for 
secrecy and agility in conducting American policy.493  Nothing is gained, they 
might say, by requiring things on the public record that Congress already 
learns in closed session when the executive reports on findings, memoranda of 
notifications, and other significant intelligence activities.  Further, the 
defenders of executive power might remind everyone that the President has the 
prerogative to decide what is classified and what is not.  They might claim 
damage (or potential damage) to American national security from too much 
detail about covert action being shared with the public. 
As far as the public knows, the Executive has not refused to explain—at 
least to the intelligence committees—the internal process to covert action.  
Even so, the two committees do not equal two branches of Congress, and two 
branches of Congress do not equal the American public. 
A cynical response to the debate about congressional and executive power 
might say that it is unlikely that the courts would become involved if my 
transparency statute were enacted—presumably over the President’s veto.  The 
political question doctrine, to use the Supreme Court’s name, would cover the 
argument with a constitutional mist.  In a free for all, my transparency statute 
might replay the maneuvers around the War Powers Resolution, another battle 
between Congress and the President on foreign policy.  For War Powers, the 
courts have stayed out of the way to let the two elected branches search for 
compromise.494 
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At the end, even with the courts on the sidelines, the two other branches 
should not commit constitutional errors.  Members of Congress, having taken 
oaths to uphold the Constitution, should not pass a statute that they believe 
violates our charter.  The President, taking care to execute all laws, should not 
put the unconstitutional into practice.  They should do what is right. 
CONCLUSION 
From the hindsight of a new century, some historical and legal markers to 
American covert action are clear.  We have gone from fixing elections in Italy 
to deposing foreign leaders in Iran and Guatemala to killing suspected 
terrorists in Yemen.  We started with something close to congressional apathy 
about political action, propaganda, paramilitary actions, and economic 
subversion—and ended with congressional participation on such projects. 
Two broad principles are also clear.  First, to defend our great nation, we 
need some sort of covert action; the State Department and the Defense 
Department are not enough.  But, second, to prevent shadow warriors from 
turning back on us, we need some measures of accountability at the CIA.  The 
challenge is to pursue these principles at the same time.  One person’s 
legitimate oversight on intelligence activities becomes another person’s 
micromanagement.  Even to the sharpest eyes, the lines between executive 
prerogative and congressional power are still blurred. 
My proposal, akin to legislation that supplanted the era of unchecked 
covert action, namely Hughes-Ryan, the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, 
and the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991, searches for an effective 
arrangement between the President and Congress.  For approving and 
conducting covert action, a bit more transparency about the process should 
help. 
My proposal is evolution, not revolution.  Besides worrying about 
terrorists who want to blow us up, the American people should worry about 
presidents who delegate too many things to their underlings and notify 
Congress too little about the dark side.  In an age of terror, Predator strikes on 
vehicles in the Yemeni desert pose significant problems for those who seek 
that elusive balance between security and democracy. 
